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I. Introduction  
With regard to the most serious crimes concerning the international community as 
a whole, the preamble of the Statute of the International Criminal Court1 expresses 
the determination to prevent these crimes by putting an end to impunity. Business 
often plays  an important role in situations of gross human rights  violations.  This 
creates a necessity of holding corporate actors to account for international crimes,2 as 
equally as state actors or leaders of armed rebel groups. While there is no doubt that 
states have the power to restrict corporate behaviour and hold business corporations 
liable for human rights violations,3 in terms of criminal liability the situation de lege 
lata in national law is disappointing. A 'regulatory vacuum' prevails in many states.4 
And  even  in  states  providing  for  corporate  criminal  liability  for  violations  of 
international law, enforcement of these laws rarely ever happens.5 This is why the use 
of International Law as a next-level solution comes into consideration.
International Criminal Law today is at its peak of development since the entering 
into force of the Rome Statute and the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court  (ICC) in  2002.  However,  the  jurisdiction  of  this  court  only covers  natural 
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002), in the following referred to as Rome 
Statute.
2 When  speaking  of  corporations  in  general,  this  contribution  refers  in  the  first  place  to 
transnationally  operating  firms.  According  to  the  United  Nations  (UN)  Norms  on  the 
responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human 
rights (2003), the term “transnational corporation” (“TNC”) is defined as “an economic entity 
operating in more than one country or a cluster of economic entities operating in two or more 
countries  -  whatever  their  legal  form”. It  can  be  used  interchangeably  with  “Multinational 
Corporation” (“MNC”).
3 Cf Beth Stephens,  “The Amorality of  Profit:  Transnational  Corporations  and  Human Rights” 
(2002) 20:45 Berkeley JInt’l L 45 at 60.
4 Daniel Leader, “Business and Human Rights – Time to Hold Companies to Account” (2008) 8:3 
IntCLR 447 at 452.
5 Kaleck interprets the scarcity of proceedings with the personal continuity in business institutions 
as opposed to political leaders and observes that different standards in the prosecution are applied 
(Julia  Geneuss  et  al,  “Core  Crimes  Inc.:  Panel  Discussion  Reports  from the  Conference  on 
‘Transnational Business and International Criminal Law’, held at Humboldt University Berlin, 











persons  and  thus  excludes  juristic  persons  such  as  corporate  entities.6 And  even 
though individual corporate actors can  in principle be held responsible before the 
ICC,7 the words of the first chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo in 2003, stressing 
the  importance  of  exploring  the  financial  aspects  of  international  crimes,8 have 
remained without consequences and not lead to investigations in these matters so far.9
Although it is beside the point to expect that international criminal law can serve as a 
'human rights-enforcement  tool',10 the basic  aim that  has  inspired this  work is  to 
explore  ways  to prevent  business  involvement  in  the  most  serious  human  rights 
violations amounting to international crimes.
1. Central Question
The present study takes on the deficit in accountability of globally acting business 
corporations and explores the suitability and legal feasibility of introducing corporate 
criminal  liability  in  international  law  as  a  solution  for  corporate  involvement  in 
6 Art. 25 (1) Rome Statute.
7 The liability of individual business actors is not part of the present study, but at the time being the 
only legal route of ensuring accountability for crimes in the corporate context, cf Hans Vest, 
“Business Leaders and the Modes of Individual Criminal Responsibility under International Law” 
(2010) 8:3 JICJ 851.
8 Referring to the exploitation of natural resources by US and European firms during the Civil War 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, “Communications Received by the 
Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC”, Press release, No: pids0092003-EN (16 July 2003) , online: 
<http://www.amicc.org/docs/Ocompo7_16_03.pdf> at 4.
9 Vest, supra note 7 at 851 et seq; Olek Fauchald & Jo Stigen, “Corporate Responsibility Before 
International Institutions” (2009) 40 The GeoWash Int’l LRev 1025 at 1040.
10 Cf Larissa van den Herik & Jernej L Cernic, “Regulating Corporations under International Law: 
From Human Rights to International Criminal Law and Back Again” (2010) 8:3 JICJ 725 at 739 
who  elaborate  that,  in  terms  of  corporate  responsibility,  international  criminal  law  is  quite 












international crimes.11 It  is  based on the assertion that  criminal punishment  is  an 
indispensable response to corporate involvement in international “core” crimes.12
The  question  whether  the  multinationals  should  be  regulated  by  international 
criminal law has been in the limelight of academic debate, but is still unresolved.13 At 
present,  corporations  cannot  be  held  liable  before  an  international  forum  for 
violations of international law.  This issue was also ignored at the Kampala Review 
Conference,14 but it is likely that a further development will happen in regard to the 
ICC.15 An evolving concept of penal law concerning business related crimes can be 
observed  in  international  practice  and  theory.16 However,  although  corporate 
accountability in international law in general has become increasingly important in 
the last decades and corporate criminal responsibility is well  established in many 
11 This study does not deal with the liability of legal persons in the public sector, particularly rebel 
groups  or  states.  The  different  status  and  motivation  of  (quasi-)  governmental  organisations 
require a clear delineation to business corporations, cf the comments of Murphy and Rishmawi in 
“Workshop Corporate Criminal Liability - Discussion” (2008) 6:5 JICJ 947 at 977.
12 The “core”  international  crimes,  laid  down in arts  5  et  seqq  Rome Statute  are  not  the  only 
criminal offences under international law. Other offences are in particular environmental crimes, 
corruption and emerging human rights related crimes such as torture. These crimes are excluded 
here, because core crimes represent not only the least common denominator, but also the gravest 
of all international crimes. It is suggested though that the notion of corporate criminal liability, 
once it has been recognised, will be applied to all offences in order to create a complete concept.
13 Cf. the special issue on  Transnational Business and International Criminal Law in (2010) 8:3 
JICJ; the Symposium Holding Multinational Corporations Responsible Under International Law 
in  (2001)  24  Hastings  Int’l  &  CompLRev  285;  and  the  extensive  contribution  of  Desislava 
Stoitchkova, Towards corporate liability in international criminal law (Antwerp Portland [Or.]: 
Intersentia, 2010).
14 A review session of the Rome Statute according to art 123 Rome Statute took place in Kampala in 
2010. However, since the focus of this session lay on the definition and procedural issues of the 
crime of aggression, the topic of corporate criminal responsibility was not set on the agenda.
15 Stoitchkova,  supra note 13 at  18;  Clapham considers a  case before the ICC necessary which 
manifests injustice due to the exclusion of corporations from the ICC in order to find political 
support for amending the Rome Statute (Andrew Clapham, “The Question of Jurisdiction Under 
International Criminal Law Over Legal Persons.” in Menno Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi, eds, 
Liability of multinational corporations under international law [The Hague; Boston: Kluwer Law 
International, 2000] at 160).
16 Cf Christoph Burchard,  “Ancillary and Neutral Business Contributions to ‘Corporate-Political 
Core Crime’: Initial Enquiries Concerning the Rome Statute” (2010) 8:3 JICJ 919 at 920 naming 












national legal systems,17 the reluctance of some states demonstrates the controversy 
in  reconciling  the  foundations  of  criminal  law  with  the  responsibility  of  legal 
entities.18
As the two fields of international law and criminal law are quite distinct, problems 
of both areas of law arise for themselves and in combination. Fundamental obstacles 
in  (domestic)  criminal  law  theory,  such  as  the  principle  of  culpability,  will  be 
considered in the light of the objects and purposes of international criminal law. Key 
issues in terms of international law are whether corporations in fact have obligations 
under international law and how a regulation de lege ferenda can be constructed in 
the  framework  of  the  Rome  Statute.  As  to  the  different  concepts  of  attributing 
criminal liability to the corporate entity, the approach of a draft provision proposed 
during the negotiations to the Rome statute is considered and a sui generis concept 
suggested.
Apart from the question whether the ICC is actually a suitable forum for bridging 
the  disconnection  between  multinationals  and  the  law,19 the  implementation  of  a 
regulation  also  raises  practical  issues,  such  as  the  reconcilability  of  the 
complementarity principle with the sovereignty of national states not providing for 
corporate  criminal  responsibility.  Presumably,  the  prosecution  of  corporations  for 
international crimes will have to remain in the hands of the states.20
2. Method and Structure
The introductory part  continues  in Chapter  II  with an illustration of  corporate 
human rights violations to make the reader familiar with the underlying problem of 
this study. After that, the  accountability gap described above is picked up and  the 
17 See  Guy  Stessens,  “Corporate  Criminal  Liability:  A Comparative  Perspective”  (1994)  43:3 
IntlCompLQ 493.
18 Cf Stoitchkova, supra note 13 at 7 et seq with further references; and the critical contribution of 
Thomas Weigend, “Societas delinquere non potest?: A German Perspective” (2008) 6 JICJ 927.
19 Cf  Stephens,  supra  note  3  at  54  observing  a  “disconnect  between  international  corporate 
structures and the law”.











need for an international regulation as a means against gross corporate human rights 
violations demonstrated. Alternative regulatory approaches are considered in order to 
prove that criminal law is the only appropriate field of regulation on the international 
level. Further, a central issue is the desirability of holding corporations  as such  to 
account.
In  Chapter  III,  the  study elaborates  on  the  tension  between the  organisational 
component in corporate crime and the individualistic notion of traditional criminal 
law  with  its  underlying  philosophic  aspects  of  moral  guilt.  This  contradiction  is 
resolved with a view to the specific objects and purposes of international criminal 
law.
Chapter  IV  reviews  the  status  quo  of  corporate  criminal  responsibility  in 
international  law.  The  first  section  traces  back  to  the  beginnings  of  international 
criminal law. In particular, judgements of the International and United States Military 
Tribunals (IMT and USMT) are analysed. Further,  a proposal on the inclusion of 
legal persons in the jurisdiction of the ICC, which was suggested in the course of the 
negotiations of the Rome Statute, is assessed to explore the legislative intentions as 
well as the objections of the delegates leading to the rejection of the proposal. A 
survey of international instruments is also conducted with view to the development 
of  corporate  criminal  liability  in  the  recent  years.  Moreover,  obligations  of 
corporations  under  customary international  law are  examined as  to  whether  they 
entail direct criminal responsibility for international crimes.
Eventually,  Chapter  V deals  with  implementing  corporate  criminal  liability  in 
international law, particularly extending the jurisdiction of the ICC to private legal 
persons. The proper forum where prosecution can take place in order to guarantee an 
effective enforcement is discussed and balanced with the complementarity principle 
of  the  ICC.  Further,  the  contextual  element  and  specific  intent  requirements  are 
examined as to their  applicability to legal  entities  as well  as practical  challenges 
regarding the complementarity principle discussed.
In conclusion, after summarising the findings, the scope of this study is put into a 











II. Regulating corporate activities  
The following section deals with preliminary questions of regulating TNCs. First 
of all, the possible negative consequences of business investment in terms of serious 
human  rights  violations  are  illustrated  and  the  term  of  Corporate  Complicity 
introduced.  After  that,  the  question  whether  regulatory  mechanisms  on  the 
international level are suited for the present purpose or whether regulation on the 
national  level  is  preferable  is  discussed.21 Further,  it  has  to  be  established  that 
criminal law is actually the appropriate field of law. In this regard, non-obligatory, 
administrative, and civil law efforts come into consideration. Lastly, the need to hold 
the corporate entity as such accountable, and not only the individual actor within the 
corporate context, constitutes a central part of the discussion.
1. Corporate human rights violations
a. The power of corporations  
A strong interdependence between  trade and public welfare as well as political 
stability  has  existed  throughout  human  history.  The  early  civilizations,  such  as 
ancient  Egypt,  could  only  create  a  heritage  of  sophisticated  arts,  culture  and 
philosophy based on its thriving trade. Today still, economic growth is a cornerstone 
for every country's peace and prosperity.22
In the context of globalised international trade, this basic proposition seems to get 
distorted under certain circumstances. International trade is growing faster than ever 
and multinationals are expanding their influence throughout the world, in developed 
as well as in developing countries. It is unavoidable that firms also face politically 
21 Distinct  from  this  problem  is  the  issue  revolving  around  the  proper  enforcement  forum 
(international regulations could also be enforced by the national states). This question is discussed 
in Chapter V.2.
22 Cf  World  Trade  Organisation,  World  Trade  Report  (Trade  and  Development,  2003)  at  82 











volatile or repressive host states. In these cases, it might be assumed that  business 
investment always contributes positively to these states' economic development and 
improves the political,  social,  and environmental  situation.  However,  the  contrary 
effect can and allegedly has occurred. The downside of direct private investment in 
the first place is environmental pollution, but it may also support poverty, hunger and 
poor health in the background of mercenary governments.23 Private corporations also 
begin to be involved in sensitive areas such as the management of prisons or even 
fighting wars as they increasingly take over traditional state activities.24 This requires 
an  increased  level  of  human  rights-compliance  and  a  corresponding  regulatory 
framework.
The enormous financial power of multinational corporations, sometimes exceeding 
the economic power of host states, can lead to a large degree of political dependency 
of  governments  on  such  corporations.  This imbalance  creates  entanglements  of 
corporate officials and political authorities, an alliance which often bears markings of 
exploitation of land, states, and people rather than a contribution to development.
In isolated cases, even gross violations of human rights can be the direct or indirect 
consequences  of  corporate  activities.25 The  business  with  repressive  governments 
may support ongoing human rights violations, and even provoke or demand the state 
to impair  human rights.  At this  point,  business is  no longer the motor of human 
development, but in fact poses a great threat to human rights.
23 Stoitchkova, supra note 13 at 1 describes the negative consequences of corporate activities aptly 
as “the dark side of corporate might”.
24 Ronald C Slye, “Corporations, Veils, and International Criminal Liability” (2008) 33:3 BrookJ 
Int’l  L 955  at  961;  cf  regarding  the  liability  of  natural  persons  Chia  Lehnardt,  “Individual 
Liability of Private Military Personnel under International Criminal Law” (2008) 19:5 EJIL 1015.
25 Gross human rights violations are understood in the present contribution as “the most egregious 
human rights abuses” affecting the whole community or society they take place in (International 
Commission of Jurists, “Corporate Complicity & Legal Accountability, Vol 1 - Facing the Facts 
and Charting a Legal Path” in [2008] at 4 et seq). Although this term is not limited to crimes 
amounting to international crimes pursuant to art. 5 et seqq of the International Criminal Court 
Statute  (ICC)  and  might  eg  also  include  torture,  this  study  focusses  on  crimes  within  the 











b. Corporate complicity  
The ways a corporation can be implicated in human rights violations can take 
various forms. When the corporation itself (ie a corporate official) actually commits 
an unlawful act, it becomes a case of direct involvement. The attribution of this type 
of corporate human rights abuses is not difficult to handle since the corporate actor is 
responsible  by causation.  Cases  of  direct  involvement  can  be traced  back  to  the 
colonial era, when multinational enterprises such as the Dutch East India Company 
heavily  engaged  in  slave  trade  and  exploitation  of  natural  resources.26 An 
unprecedented example of direct corporate involvement in human rights abuses took 
place  in  the  Holocaust  of  Nazi  Germany.27 The  post-World  War  II  trials  held  at 
Nuremberg (Nuremberg trials)28 also mark the starting point at which international 
law began to deal with business involvement in international crimes. However, since 
that  time  direct  involvement  can  rarely  be  observed.  The  most  obvious,  but  not 
necessarily unproblematic case in recent times has been the killing of civilians by 
mercenary soldiers of the private military firm Blackwater during the Iraq War.29
The  challenge  nowadays  is  rather  to  deal  with  an  indirect  involvement  of 
corporations  in  international  crimes,  actually committed by government  forces  or 
non-state actors such as armed rebel groups. In these cases, the corporate conduct 
appears prima facie to be morally and legally neutral.30 But having a closer look, the 
26 Cf Stephens, supra note 3 at 49 on the “Corporate Human Rights Problem”.
27 For  an  extensive  examination of  transnational  corporations  and  the  Holocaust,  see  Stephens, 
supra note 3.
28 The  general  term  “Nuremberg  trials”  includes  different  military  tribunals.  The  major  war 
criminals (ie the highest ranking political and military leaders) were tried before the International 
Military  Tribunal  (IMT),  established  by  The  London  Charter  of  the  International  Military 
Tribunal (1945). Subsequently, the United States of America (USA) created a national military 
tribunal (USMT) under Law No. 10 on the Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes 
Against  Peace  and  Against  Humanity (1945)  to  try  a  series  of  other  selected  war  criminals 
(“follow-up trials”). For a discussion of the judgements by the USMT, see Chapter IV.1.
29 For  an  overview  of  the  proceedings  against  the  firm  itself  and  its  employees,  see  Wilhelm 
Huisman & Elies van Sliedregt, “Rogue Traders: Dutch Businessmen, International Crimes and 
Corporate Complicity” (2010) 8:3 JICJ 803 at 816 (fn 54).
30 The problem of  neutral  contributions  to  crimes,  defined  as  “contributions  … not  necessarily 
imply[ing]  a  specific  social  harm or  an  unacceptable  danger  to  protected  legal  interests”  by 
Burchard, supra note 16 at 921 (fn 6), is not an issue arising only in the international sphere. It is 











corporation is somehow implicated with the perpetrator(s) as it is a beneficiary of the 
profits  generated  from  human  rights  violations.  Many  examples  are  worth 
mentioning  to  illustrate  the  danger  of  doing  business  in  the  vicinity  of  difficult 
human rights situations. For example the petroleum company Shell has to defend 
several lawsuits for being involved in the executions by state forces of protesters 
against the company's activities in Nigeria in the early 1990s.31 A few years later, an 
Indian subsidiary of the US-corporation Enron, one of the former world’s largest 
energy companies,  unlawfully  influenced  the  local  government  and  made  use  of 
Indian police forces to violently oppress local resistance against a massive energy 
project.32
A very recent  example  shows at  which  risk  corporations  doing  business  with 
repressive states are to get involved by mere acquiescence in human rights abuses 
carried out by the government of the host state. According to a report of  Human 
Rights  Watch  (HRW),  one  of  the  leading  international  non-governmental 
organisations in the human rights sector, the Canadian firm Nevsun Resources has 
become complicit with forced labour allegations against the government of Eritrea.33 
Nevsun entered into a joint venture with a state owned construction company to mine 
the vast and largely unexplored gold reserves in Eritrea. This construction company 
receives support of conscripts from the “national service program”, a governmental 
initiative forcing an enormous number of Eritreans to work for an indefinite time 
period  under  abusive  conditions.  Nevsun  did  not  conduct  a  human  rights  due 
diligence before engaging in the project, but tried to clear up the allegations with the 
Eritrean  company  after  being  informed  by  HRW.  These  efforts,  however,  were 
obstructed in total  by the other  side.  Instead of giving up the project,  Nevsun is 
continuing to operate the mine. Because of that HRW accuses the firm of having 
31 Cases against Shell have been filed before US (national) courts for violations of international law 
under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), see Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 226 F3d 88 
(2nd Cir 2000) and most recently Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). 
The latter case is also examined in Chapter IV.4.b.
32 See Human Rights  Watch,  The Enron Corporation – Corporate Complicity in  Human Rights 
Violations (1999).












become complicit in the human rights abuses of the Eritrean government by quietly 
accepting forced labour at its own mine site.
The term “Corporate Complicity” has been shaped by HRW to express morally 
wrongful involvement of corporations in human rights abuses.34 It did not express a 
legal conviction though and had thus no elements of crime.35 To transform this moral 
concept into a legal concept presupposes a clear definition of complicity. The Expert 
Legal  Panel  on Corporate  Complicity  of  the  International  Commission  of  Jurists 
(ICJ)  determines  the  threshold  to  legal  responsibility  using  the  principles  of 
causation, knowledge and proximity, according to which the 'zone of legal risk is 
entered if (1) the corporate conduct enabled, exacerbated or facilitated human rights 
violations  abuses',  (2)  the  corporate  officials  knew  or  should  have  known  the 
likelihood that their actions would contribute to the human rights abuse, or (3) the 
business  activity  was  close  or  proximate  to  the  perpetrator  or  victims 
(geographically,  but  also  in  terms  of  the  duration,  frequency  or  intensity  of 
interactions or relationship).36
Although the threshold for liability is at the heart of constructing legal responsibility 
for business involvement in criminal offences, it will not be recessed here in depth.37 
As a preliminary issue applying to natural and juristic persons equally, it is not of 
direct relevance for the purpose of the present study.
34 Cf Human Rights Watch, supra note 32.
35 Roth in note 11 at 959 et seq.
36 International Commission of Jurists, supra note 25 at 8 et seq.
37 For a thorough examination, see Norman Farrell,  “Attributing Criminal Liability to Corporate 
Actors:  Some Lessons  from the International  Tribunals”  (2010) 8:3 JICJ  873;  and Burchard, 
supra note 16; cf also Anita Ramasastry, “Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon – 
An  examination  of  Forced  Labor  Cases  and  Their  Impact  on  the  Liability  of  Multinational 
Corporations”  (2001) 20:91 Berkeley JInt’l  L 91 at  117 developing a  standard for  corporate 











2. The need for international regulation
First of all, it is questionable whether it is not the domestic state, ie the home state 
or host state,38 which is the preferable actor to ensure corporate accountability. In 
fact, with regard to maintaining internal order, national regulation comes by its very 
nature  prior  to  international  regulation.  Further,  special  provisions  such  as  in 
corporate law, labour law, and environmental law are much closer to the specific 
conditions within the corporate operating field and consistent with the domestic legal 
system. The need for regulation of corporate activity by international law can thus 
only exist as far as domestic law has proven ineffective.39 In this regard, the failure of 
states, if not inability at all, to control transnational business activities comes into 
consideration.
In the course of globalisation, corporations have become able to act flexibly on a 
transnational level while domestic legal systems to a large degree have remained 
bound  to  their  territory.40 This  has  created  a  disconnection of  the  international 
corporate structures from the law.41 Stephens observes that TNCs have 'outgrown' the 
national legal structures, 'reaching a level of transnationality and economic power 
that exceeds domestic law's ability to impose basic human rights norms'.42 While 
multinationals  act  in  a  network  of  affiliated  companies,  law  focusses  on  'each 
component company, rather than on the group, as the legal actor'.43 Firms also tend to 
shift  legal  forms  in  order  to  prevent  liability,  which  creates  legal  barriers  for 
accountability.44 Often,  the  state  of  incorporation  has  only  been  chosen  for  tax 
38 While  home  state  refers  to  the  state  of  incorporation,  host  state  means  the  state  where  the 
corporate wrongdoing actually takes place.
39 Cf Fauchald & Stigen, supra note 9 at 1027.
40 As a constraint, the efforts the World Trade Organization (WTO) for harmonising rules of trade 
between nations are highlighted. 
41 Stephens, supra note 3 at 54.
42 Ibid.
43 Phillip Blumberg, The multinational challenge to corporation law: the search for a new corporate 
personality. (New York: Oxford University, 1993) at 205.












reasons or other advantages, but does not form the actual seat. Further, the flexible 
“de-nationalised”  structure  with  multiple  production  facilities  enables  TNCs  to 
escape  national  regulation  by  shifting  assets  and  moving  activities  between  the 
countries. TNCs can therefore truly be regarded as global players in the sense that 
their field of operation is the whole globe, not the territory of a single state. 
Any  regulatory  approach,  whether  civil,  criminal  or  administrative  in  nature, 
needs to match the structures of multinationals to create a level playing field.45 As 
Stephens substantiates, this 'requires international consensus on the norms applicable 
to corporations' as well as 'coordinated enforcement mechanisms, whether through 
international  systems  or  through  coordinated  domestic  structures'.46 Only  an 
international regulation provides a uniform and consistent level of accountability. 
The need for an international regulation is increased by the practical difficulties of 
states to effectively enforce existing regulations. As touched on in the introduction, 
host states in politically and economically unstable conditions de facto do not have 
the power to hold firms accountable. In fact, they are often depended on them and 
will  therefore  acquiesce  to  their  will  which  is  dominated  by  the  aim  of  profit 
maximisation. '[S]tates may prefer the investments and the economic activity of a 
culprit-corporation over the need to protect their citizens from such a corporation', or 
even collaborate with the corporation's deeds.47 For this reason, TNCs in some cases 
even  deliberately  choose  to  invest  in  politically  weak  states  in  order  to  avoid 
regulatory patronising.48
This  aspect  is  also  relevant  in  terms  of  formal  design  of  an  international 
regulation. Speaking of this, what we have in mind is mostly direct regulation, ie that 
obligations are imposed directly on corporations as subject of international law.49 On 
45 Blumberg, supra note 43 at 201.
46 Stephens, supra note 3 at 48 and 59.
47 Mordechai  Kremnitzer,  “A Possible  Case for  Imposing Criminal  Liability on Corporations  in 
International Criminal Law” (2010) 8:3 JICJ 909 at 916–917.
48 Slye, supra note 24 at 961.
49 The legal question whether international law ascribes legal subjectivity to business corporations 











the  other  hand,  it  is  also  possible  to  only  indirectly  regulate  corporations  by 
committing  national  states  to  impose  obligations  on  corporations  under  domestic 
law.50 The difference, and also the reason why an indirect regulation does not solve 
the present problem, lies in its legal effect. The implementation and enforcement of 
indirect  obligations  is  left  to  each  national  state,  which  could  only  be  held 
responsible for violating the duty to legislate. Vis-à-vis business corporations as the 
actual addressee, however, indirect obligations as such have no legal effect under 
international law at all.51 Having in mind the regulation gap at the domestic level, 
transnational  corporate  activities  can  only  be  effectively  held  to  account  by 
subjecting them directly to international law without any intermediary steps. Further, 
regarding the insufficient enforcement of existing domestic regulation, only direct 
regulation creates the possibility to hold corporations liable before an international 
institution.
3. Nature of regulation - Why criminal law?
Once the necessity for an international regulation is demonstrated, the question 
arises,  which field  of  law is  most  suitable.  It  is  noteworthy at  this  occasion that 
business corporations in many domestic jurisdictions can be made responsible under 
different  laws  concurrently,  while  international  law  provides  only  for  criminal 
liability of non-state actors.
a. Soft law instruments  
At first, a regulation of legally not binding nature comes into consideration as the 
least  restrictive measure.  This has been the approach of several  international law 
initiatives  on  the  regulation  of  multinational  corporations,  such  as  the  OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
concerning Multinational  Enterprises and Social  Policy,  the UN Global Compact, 
50 The  indirect  regulation  by  international  law  is  a  common  practice  in  many  international 
instruments as demonstrated in Chapter IV.3.











and the Institutional Integrity Department of the World Bank.52 These instruments in 
part  explicitly  'recommend'53 but  also  urge  business  to  respect  'internationally 
recognised human rights'.54 
However, the flaw of non-binding efforts lies in two characteristics. Firstly, they 
do not specify clear and enforceable rules but rather express general  guidelines.55 
They are hence to be classified as a policy tool, but not a regulation in the strict 
sense.  A voluntary instrument  can  further  not  be enforced  against  the will  of  its 
addressees and does therefore not constitute a solution for the present demand.56
b. Private law  versus  criminal law  
In the domestic law of the USA, civil claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act 
(ATCA)57 have  proven  to  be  a  'central  mechanism'  of  holding  transnational 
corporations accountable for human rights violations.58 Civil law suits for tort have 
the advantage of fulfilling the financial needs of the victims by awarding damages 
and  simultaneously  providing  pecuniary  punishment  for  the  defendant. 
Responsibility  under  private  law  could  thus  very  well  be  a  solution  also  at  the 
international level.
However, it has to be stressed that the  structure of international law is not fully 
developed with regard to civil action. While many national systems have established 
a sophisticated interplay of sanctions and reparations for corporations in different 
52 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises,  2011 Edition (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011).;  International Labour Organisation 
(ILO), Procedure for the Examination of Disputes Concerning the Application of the Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (2001); for The 
United Nations Global Compact (1999) see <http://www.unglobalcompact.org>; The World Bank 
Group, Improving Development Outcomes: Annual Integrity Report, I, Report No. 41901 (2007).
53 Art 1 of the Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, Ibid at 7.
54 Ibid, paragraph 2 of Part II (General Policies).
55 Cf for an in-depth analysis van den Herik & Cernic, supra note 10 at 733.
56 Likewise Stoitchkova, supra note 13 at 13.
57 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
58 Katherine Gallagher, “Civil Litigation and Transnational Business: An Alien Tort Statute Primer” 











fields  of  law,  no  such  “holistic”  system  exists  on  the  international  level.  The 
foundation of international law is not the all-encompassing sovereignty of a national 
state,  but  merely  a  patchwork  of  delegated  powers.  International  law  originally 
exclusively dealt with states, and non-state actors were made subject only with the 
introduction of criminal liability for violations of international law. Today still, there 
are no alternative institutions to criminal tribunals on the international level.59 The 
argument  from  a  domestic  law  context,  that  a  functioning  system  of  corporate 
responsibility  other  than  criminal  liability  is  in  place,  does  not  apply  in  the 
international context.60 In fact,  this lack of legal remedies currently renders TNCs 
immune from responsibility for violations of international law,61 and produces the 
difficulties leading to the main question of this paper.
Further,  the  practical  hurdles  of  civil  proceedings  against  TNCs  should  be 
highlighted. In civil law the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. Hence, criminal law 
takes preference as the state is responsible for investigating the matter, collecting 
evidence, and initiating proceedings.62 This takes a lot of pressure from the victims, 
who most often not have the resources to file a lawsuit or settle the case in seeing 
that  the  chances  of  success  are  unpredictable.63 Moreover,  as  in  many domestic 
jurisdictions,  the  victim  may  be  provided  with  legal  remedies  to  force  criminal 
investigations,64 which is an important step towards bridging the enforcement gap. 
Criminal sanctioning thus 'may be the only mechanism to be able to confront big and 
strong corporations'.65 Simultaneously, criminal proceedings also serve to protect the 
corporation  on  trial  since  the  highest  level  of  due  process  is  applied.  This  is 
59 Cf Fletcher in note 11 at 979.
60 Cockayne in Ibid at 955 referring to Weigend, supra note 18 at 942.
61 Cockayne in note 11 at 955.
62 Cf Kaleck in Geneuss et al, supra note 5 at 966.
63 Cf  Eric  Engle,  “Extraterritorial  Corporate  Criminal  Liability:  A Remedy  for  Human  Rights 
Violations?” (2006) 20 StJohn’s  JLegal  Comment  287 at  312 et.  seq.  with further  references 
referring to the “Winner takes it all” rule in civil law.
64 Cf the argument of Swart in note 11 at 952.
65 Kremnitzer, supra note 47 at 916 demanding at least a binding effect for civil action of facts 











especially important in regard to the seriousness of an accusation for international 
crimes.
On  the  other  hand,  civil  litigation  seems  to  serve  the  goal  of  justice  more 
effectively  in  contrast  to  criminal  law  with  its  higher  burden  of  proof  and 
sophisticated procedural standards for the protection of the accused. This argument 
holds even more since, as Gallagher points out, the legal nature of the proceedings is 
less  important  considering  that  the  need  of  victims  in  the  first  place  is  not 
compensation,  but  recognition  of  what  happened  to  them.66 Civil  litigation  is 
consistent with a victim-centred view, for the principle of party disposition allows for 
the victim as the central figure to hold the judicial proceedings in its hands.
However,  a  compelling  counterargument,  based  on  the  gravity  of  egregious 
human rights abuses, challenges this general consideration. Clapham pleads to take 
corporate crime seriously by legitimately demanding to treat 'the death of hundreds 
of people through corporate recklessness … the same way as a single death through 
individual  thoughtlessness'.67 In  short,  there  is  just  no  way  around  criminal 
punishment  when  speaking  of  gross  human  rights  violations  of  concern  to  the 
international  community  as  a  whole.68 This  also  puts  into  question  the  victim's 
disposition over the proceedings. When the international community is concerned, 
party disposition can hardly be reconciled with the public interest and the right of all 
nations to inflict punishment.69
In terms of prevention as a goal of international criminal justice, only a criminal 
judgement  labels  serious human rights violations as what they are,  crimes.70 This 
66 Gallagher in Geneuss et al, supra note 5 at 975.
67 Cf Clapham, supra note 15 at 195.
68 Alike Kremnitzer, supra note 47 at 915.
69 It must be noted, though, that the principle of  ex officio  disposition and generally the goal of 
establishing the truth is  being constrained by the common practice of  plea bargaining. For a 
thorough examination, see Michael  P Scharf, “Trading Justice for Efficiency: Plea-Bargaining 
and International Tribunals” (2004) 2:4 JICJ 1070.











stigmatisation  produces  an  increased  deterrent  effect  in  contrast  to  tort  law 
damages.71 For the same reason are administrative sanctions not a suitable response 
to  corporate  involvement  in  core  international  crimes.  Non-criminal  sanctioning 
generally implies a picture of misdemeanour.72
Notwithstanding, it is not argued here that civil law is an unsuitable field of law 
for dealing with international crimes, but that the stigma of criminal sanctioning is 
indispensable. With regard to many domestic legal systems differing between public 
and  private  law,  the  relationship  between  civil  law  and  criminal  law  is  rightly 
described as  parallel. The flip side of every criminal responsibility is civil liability 
side by side.
4. Corporate accountability – Why corporations?
At the heart of the discussion about accountability for business involvement in 
human rights abuses lies the question, whether subject of the liability should be the 
individual  corporate  official(s)  only,  or also the corporate  entity itself.  While  the 
liability of individual  business actors is  well  established in  international  criminal 
law,73 the present study pursues to demonstrate the need for a liability of the legal 
person as such. This aspect needs further discussion since it is by some authors not 
only held unnecessary to combat corporate human rights abuses,74 but also rejected 
for legal reasons.75
71 Ramasastry, supra note 37 at 153; On the other hand, Adam G Safwat & Sara Sun Beale, “What 
Developments  in  Western  Europe  Tell  Us  about  American  Critiques  of  Corporate  Criminal 
Liability” (2004) 8 BuffCrimLRev 89 at 101 et seq question whether the deterrence argument 
may backfire when criminal punishment for corporations is “actually the least costly penalty from 
the firm’s point of view”.
72 Kremnitzer, supra note 47 at 915 points out that “[w]hen non-criminal liability is imposed for a 
very serious crime committed consciously, it puts the severity of the crime and the importance of 
the protected value in doubt, if not in disrepute.”
73 Cf. Florian Jessberger, “On the Origins of Individual Criminal Responsibility under International 
Law for Business Activity: IG Farben on Trial” (2010) 8 JICJ 783.
74 Farell and Werle in Geneuss et al, supra note 5 at 971 er seq. for example hold international 
criminal law de lege ferenda as sufficient to combat corporate crime.












a. Coexistence of individual and corporate liability  
First of all, it is made clear that the relation between the two subjects of liability 
should  not  be  alternative  but  cumulative.  Corporate  liability  is  not  supposed  to 
substitute,  but  to  complement  individual  liability.  In  collective  crime,  wrongful 
behaviour  exists  on  the  individual  as  well  as  on  the  organisational  level.76 The 
problem of double jeopardy (ne bis in idem) is not of concern here since the liability 
attaches  to  different  subjects  of  law,  ie  the  individual  and  the  corporate  entity. 
Further, the objection that organs of a corporation may use the legal entity to shield 
themselves  from  individual  responsibility  is  without  any  reason.77 It  might  be 
appropriate  though  to  try  the  corporation  before  an  international  forum and  the 
individual  perpetrator(s)  before  a  domestic  court  instead.78 By  that,  pressure  of 
powerful corporations on the state to limit  the liability of the corporation can be 
antagonised,  as  the  financial  and  political  influence  of  TNCs  diminishes  on  the 
international level.79
b. Reference to domestic law  
The notion of corporate criminal liability may be backed by the trend in domestic 
law since the recognition in national jurisdictions creates a 'prima facie indication of 
its utility'.80 Not only is corporate criminal liability well established in common law 
countries, but also has a 'fundamental shift' recently been observed in the civil law 
systems of western European countries, which traditionally rejected this notion.81 On 
the other hand, this issue has never ceased to be contested.82 A comparative survey 
also is to be regarded with caution, as the understanding of criminal liability itself 
76 For the organisational component in corporate crime, see Chapter III.1.
77 Kremnitzer, supra note 47 at 917.
78 The suitable enforcement forum is discussed at length in Chapter V.
79 Kremnitzer, supra note 47 at 917.
80 Ibid at 914.
81 See the in-depth analysis of Safwat & Beale, supra note 71 at 105 et seq.











may differ in each legal system.83 And after all, as touched on above, responsibility 
and subjectivity in international law has developed from a totally different starting 
point as national laws, and is therefore only limited comparable. Not at least due to 
the  legitimacy  concerns  about  international  criminal  courts  in  general,  as  Goti 
suggests, 'prosecutions should be limited to cases of shared basic intuitions across 
national boundaries and cultures as to the reprehensibility of acts'.84 In fact, it would 
be daring to induce the permissibility of corporate criminal liability in international 
from national developments. Then again, it does neither serve as a counter argument.
c. Aims of international criminal justice.  
A fundamental  argument  for  the  inclusion  of  corporate  liability  is  that  the 
conviction of individuals cannot appropriately reflect the dimension of the wrongful 
action. This concerns particularly  the purpose of international criminal proceedings 
to create an accurate historical record.85 Establishing the truth is an important aspect 
in the context of transitional justice, where the proceedings are an important part of 
reprocessing the past. The individualisation of responsibility can produce distortions 
of the historical reality.86 
An example illustrating this effect can be found in the atrocity of ethnic cleansing 
in Yugoslavia. The trials of individuals pretend a picture of only a small group of 
leaders  being responsible.  However,  the supportive attitude of a large part  of the 
population at that time casts a shadow of guilt over the whole country.87 Similarly, 
with regard to the atrocities of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) for example, Roth 
describes  that  'it  makes  a  world  difference  whether  there  were  a  handful  of 
83 Celia Wells, Corporations and criminal responsibility,  2nd ed. ed (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) at 129.
84 M Goti in Geneuss et al, supra note 5 at 971.
85 Note,  “Developments in the Law - International Criminal  Law: The promises of international 
prosecution” (2001) 114:7 HarvLRev 1957 at 1973.
86 Mirijan R Damaska, “What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?” (2008) 83:1 Chi-Kent 
LRev 329 at 333.
87 As Damaska (Ibid at 333 with further references) explains, the trials of individuals were intended 












individuals  that  were  responsible  for  crimes  against  humanity  here  or  there,  or 
whether the RPF, as a corporate entity was responsible.'88 
This equally holds in a corporate context, and generally collective entities sharing 
a  common  purpose.  It  is  a  common  impression  that  within  an  organisation 
individuals are chosen as a kind of scapegoat in order to prevent clearing the whole 
extent of wrongdoing. Only direct liability of the legal entity is capable to address the 
collective culture in which the crime occurred. After all, business corporations are 
perceived as real and accountable actors by the public.89 It thus touches the core of 
justice and turns the principle of equality before the law upside down, when low-
ranking officials are punished but the corporation as the patron is immune.90
A similar argument turns on deterrence as basic aim of criminal punishment. In 
terms  of  prevention  of  corporate  wrongdoing  it  seems  logical  to  address  the 
corporation itself. In fact, 'effective deterrence of collective actions requires systemic 
punishment'.91 As decision making and division of labour in a firm is a process that 
exceeds the fault of the single employees, individual punishment misses the actual 
aim.
Further,  the  lack  of  tort  law  remedies  on  the  international  level  serves  as  an 
argument for the use of corporate criminal prosecution. A simple utilitarian approach 
takes on the financial potency of TNCs. Since compensation is an important aspect of 
promoting  justice  for  the  victims  apart  from  acknowledgement,  pecuniary 
punishment of firms is a powerful tool.92 This also serves justice for the individual 
perpetrators,  as  the  employees  are  generally  neither  direct  beneficiaries  of  the 
corporate  crime,  nor  do  they  have  the  financial  resources  like  a  firm.  By 
88 K Roth in: note 11 at 976 accuses the ICTR from having run away from this question.
89 Maurice Punch, “The organizational component in corporate crime” in James J Gobert & Ana-
Maria Pascal, eds, European developments in corporate criminal liability (Routledge, 2011) at 
101 et seq.
90 Kremnitzer, supra note 47 at 914.
91 Slye, supra note 24 at 960.
92 Clapham in Geneuss et al, supra note 5 at 972 sees the fact that companies had “deep pockets” as 
a legitimate answer to the question why international criminal law is discussed in the context of 











implementation of an  adhesive procedure (partie civile), victims would be able to 
claim compensation from the corporation directly through the criminal proceedings.93 
However,  criminal  sanctioning  for  the  sake  of  reparations  alone  (a  private  law 
matter)  seems  beyond  the  point.  In  fact,  corporate  criminal  liability  is  not  even 
required for this purpose. If it is only about reparations then a tort adhesive procedure 
against the firm could as well be implemented in the trial of an individual corporate 
official.94
d. Systemic element in international crimes  
A systemic (policy)  element  is  inherent  to  international  core crimes.  The core 
crimes laid down in arts 5 et seqq Rome Statute often presuppose collective action, 
such as a 'widespread or systematic attack' for crimes against humanity as well as 
war crimes 'committed as part of a plan or policy'.95 Similarly the crime of genocide, 
although not expressively required, is interpreted to usually involve collective action. 
Hence, the challenge of dealing with crimes committed by organised groups is not 
unknown to  international  criminal  law,96 In  favour  of  collective  liability  Zappala 
therefore legitimately asks whether it is 'not the very nature of international crimes to 
go beyond individual culpability'.97
This corresponds to the challenges international criminal justice has to cope with 
today.  Changing  social  realities  require  an  adaptation  of  the  way  liability  is 
attributed. As the governmental and societal structures change, also criminal activity 
is no longer organised on the basis of strict  command and control. In particular the 
nature of warfare has changed in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of “9/11” in the 
USA. Hierarchical structures are more and more flattened and replaced by networked 
93 Cf Gaeta in note 11 at 975.
94 Cf Fletcher and Murphy in: Ibid at 977.
95 Arts 7 and 8 of the Rome statute.
96 Cf Slye, supra note 24 at 961.
97 Zapalla in: note 11 at 973. Only the approach followed by the Rome Statute is different. Instead 
of punishing the collective entity who committed the crime, the individual participation in that 
crime is criminalised (Cf Clapham, supra note 15 at 145.). For a detailed discussion regarding the 











relationships. TNCs can potentially be an important part of such a network without 
directly getting involved in attacks and atrocities. After all, criminal responsibility 
will  thus  have  to  be  determined  rather  by  the  criteria  of  'influence,  culture  and 
collective enterprise' than individual guilt.98
e. Evidentiary problems  
At a first glance, it may seem a great challenge to proof collective wrongdoing in 
contrast to mere individual criminal conduct. On the other hand, there are also huge 
difficulties in establishing individual fault within a collective entity operating with 
division  of  labour  in  non-hierarchical  structures.  This  problem  gets  far  more 
complicated in the context of business since responsibility is not similarly clear to 
determine as in state or military organisations.99 The liability of legal entities actually 
has practical advantages to individual responsibility. It can be more difficult to prove 
that  an  individual  has  committed  a  crime,  than  to  prove  that  'the  entity  itself  is 
organised in such a way that crimes happened', especially in cases of omission.100 It is 
the very nature of corporate crime that several  individual actors contribute to the 
crime in different ways. They act under the firm policy and are generally replaceable.
Moreover, if the actions of individuals do not suffice to hold any of them liable, or 
if the individual perpetrator is absconding, deceases or becomes unable to stand trial, 
the  crime  remains  unpunished  at  all.101 Reclaiming  the  fundamental  aim  of 
international criminal justice to end impunity, the legal framework must provide for 
means to come to a conviction in these cases as well.102 Under this maxim, corporate 
liability  is  not  only  a  solution  for  the  difficulties  in  attributing  responsibility  to 
corporate officials, but for preventing impunity in general.
98 Cockayne in note 11 at 957.
99 Cf Kaleck in Geneuss et al, supra note 5 at 963.
100 Clapham in note 11 at 970.
101 Slye, supra note 24 at 962.











Eventually, with a view to proceedings before the ICC it has to be noted that cases 
concerning international crimes always involve complex factual circumstances.103
f. Conclusion  
After  all,  there  are  strong arguments  in  favour  of  holding the corporate  entity 
criminally responsible. For the rest, it has to be stressed again that nothing is lost by 
introducing corporate liability since individual liability is not supposed to be blocked 
out. Both forms of liability address different different legal subjects and do therefore 
coexist as an aliud.
5. A word on corporate groups 
Although the details of a suitable legal approach to corporate liability cannot be 
analysed  in  this  study,  an  issue  which  is  of  great  relevance  in  the  context  of 
regulating  TNCs  should  be  highlighted  here.104 Multinationals  are  in  practice 
organised in a group structure and operate in networks of subsidiaries and suppliers. 
This marks an important difference to state agencies, which are rather hierarchically 
organised. The parent company's assets can quarantined from liability by delegating 
high-risk operations to foreign subsidiaries with limited liability. In fact, the majority 
of  firms  involved  in  international  crimes  are  local  actors.  In  the  case  of  legal 
proceedings, these subsidiaries can be liquidated and assets shifted within the group 
to escape liability. By doing so, TNCs apparently exploit the principles of separate 
legal  personality  and  limited  liability.105 It  is  therefore  an  essential  aspect  of 
regulation  to  provide  for  a  mechanism  to  “pierce  the  corporate  veil”  of  the 
subsidiaries  and  hold  the  parent  company responsible.  Interestingly,  international 
criminal  law is  not  unprepared  for  these  constellations.  The  concept  of  superior 
103 International  Commission  of  Jurists,  “Corporate  Complicity  & Legal  Accountability,  Vol  2  - 
Criminal Law and International Crimes” in (2008) at 56 et seq.
104 See Stoitchkova, supra note 13 at 139 et seqq. for an in-depth examination of “culpability beyond 
the confines of the corporate form”.











responsibility106 for example can be seen as a suitable tool for constructing criminal 
responsibility  of  parent  corporations  in  relation  to  offences  committed  by 
subsidiaries.107
106 Art 28 (b) Rome Statute.











III. Criminal responsibility and the corporate entity  
The catchy statement that corporations have 'no soul to damn, no body to kick'108 
is frequently cited by opponents of corporate criminal liability109 and demonstrates 
the difficulties  in  squeezing the  corporate  entity into  the dogmatic  framework of 
criminal  responsibility.  This  Chapter  evaluates  the  fundamental  challenges  the 
characteristics  of  corporations  pose  to  the  traditional  concept  of  criminal 
responsibility. Central to the discussion are the frictions between corporate crime as 
organisational  deviance  and the  moral  guilt  premise  in  criminal  law theory.  The 
principle of nulla poena sine culpa,110 being one of the key principles of criminal law, 
is a major doctrinal obstacle for imposing criminal liability on corporations. As these 
issues are largely identical with the debate in domestic criminal law systems, a focus 
is set on the complexity international law adds to the debate.
1. The organisational component in corporate crime
In contrast to individual criminal action, crime with a collective dimension bears 
fundamental differences not only quantitatively due to its escalating impact, but also 
qualitatively with regard to its  criminological causes and  modus operandi.111 This 
holds especially for TNCs, for they operate in a worldwide network of subsidiaries 
and responsibilities are spread to various management levels. The determination of a 
reproachable act (or omission) entailing criminal responsibility is affected by these 
peculiarities.
108 Baron Thurlow cited in Wells, supra note 83 at 76.
109 Eg John C Coffee, “‘No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick’: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the 
Problem of Corporate Punishment” (1981) 79:3 MiL 386.
110 The maxim translates from Latin to “No punishment without guilt”. It traces to a deeply ethic 
understanding of criminal law and implies that criminal punishment requires the ability to make a 
moral choice.











Stoitchkova  rightly  points  out  that  '[c]orporate  crime  materialises  through 
collective  action  (or  blameworthy  inaction)  and  cannot  be  detached  from  the 
institutional framework in which it takes place'.112 This assumes, according to Punch, 
'that in some way the firm's institutional context and culture shape an environment 
that encourages, colludes or is culpably blind to law-breaking'.113 Collective deviance 
is also accommodated in international crimes, with the distinction that the collectives 
mostly are states or organised military groups.114 It is 'irrespective of their nature and 
goals  [that]  groups  have  the  propensity  to  legitimise  immoral,  or  even  illegal 
decisions  and  actions.  They  feature  a  “culture  of  normality”,  which  routinises 
decision-making, rationalises choices and serves to defuse the moral connotations of 
deviant practices.'115
The essence of organisation theory is that organisational decision making involves 
negotiations of different parties and does not go by the preferences of any individual. 
It  is  the  process  itself  which  amounts  to  an  autonomous  decision  of  the  legal 
person.116 '[C]orporations  exhibit  their  own special  kind  of  intentionality,  namely 
corporate policy',117 which extends beyond the mere sum of the individual's state of 
mind.118
2. The individualistic nature of criminal responsibility
It is questionable where the traditional hesitation of some domestic jurisdictions 
towards the notion of corporate criminal responsibility stems from. Most notably, 
when  tracing  back  the  historical  development  of  criminal  justice,  in  particular 
112 Ibid at 28. This phenomenon is the basis of the argument raised above for the introduction of 
corporate liability, that individual liability will never “get the whole picture”, cf. Chapter II.
113 Punch, supra note 89 at 101.
114 Stoitchkova, supra note 13 at 23.
115 Ibid.
116 Cf Slye, supra note 24 at 963 with further references.
117 Fisse and Braithwaite (1988), cited in Wells, supra note 83 at 71.











Western European civil law systems originally acknowledged corporate liability.119 It 
was only in the course of the French revolution and the advent of individualism that 
criminal law focussed solely on individuals.120 The historical background bespeaks 
the  underlying  ideological  dimension,  namely  the  discovery  of  the  individual, 
abstract from relationships and the community it exists in.121 Since criminal law in 
terms  of  its  foundations  is  intertwined  with  ethical  concepts  of  its  time,  the 
'historically  specific  cultural  emphasis  on  the  individual  rather  than  on  the 
community or society' was influential to the idea of criminal responsibility.122
The  individualistic  preoccupation  of  criminal  law  has  shaped  the  legal 
requirements  of  criminal  responsibility  over  time.  As  legal  systems  have 
subsequently approached the notion  of corporate liability,  difficulties arose in the 
effort of applying existing instruments to legal entities. It is not only that the actus  
reus requirement is affected by the idea of direct causation, which links the liability 
to an act (or omission) carried out by a human being. The seemingly insurmountable 
obstacle is particularly that fault ascription presupposes the ability to act rationally 
and autonomously,123 which assumes the existence of some mental element (mens 
rea).124 Consequently, criminal resp nsibility presupposes a moral agent, featuring 'a 
sense of the self, a free will, and a moral conscience', and thus implying the existence 
of a human actor.125 Corporations in contrast,  as legal fictions by nature,  lack (at 
119 Stessens, supra note 17 at 494.
120 Stoitchkova, supra note 13 at 28.
121 See Wells, supra note 83 at 72 et seq for a lengthy analysis of this fundamental cultural shift.
122 Ibid at 64. The maxim 'societas delinquere non potest' is prevalent since then. It  describes the 
inability of  legal  persons to  commit a  delict  and has  served opponents  of  corporate  criminal 
liability as a striking argument.
123 Michael Moore, “The Moral and Metaphysical Sources of the Criminal Law” in James Pennock 
& John W Chapman, eds, Criminal justice (New York [u.a.]: New York Univ. Press, 1985) at 23.
124 For a discussion of arguments against strict subjectivism, see Wells, supra note 83 at 66–67.
125 Ana-Maria  Pascal,  “Philosophical  underpinnings  of  corporate  criminal  liability”  in  James  J 
Gobert  &  Ana-Maria  Pascal,  eds,  European  developments  in  corporate  criminal  liability 











least) a moral conscience.126 In a conventional individualistic understanding they are 
therefore excluded as non-accountable, together with animals, infants and insane.127
The debate emerging from the assertion that legal entities cannot be regarded as a 
moral agent, is controversial to its details and goes deeply into philosophical issues, 
ranging from the metaphysical existence of corporate personality to moral agency.128 
Wolf outlines the problem by asking, '[a]re organisations ever morally blameworthy 
themselves or is the apparent blameworthiness of organisations always more properly 
regarded as a function of the blameworthiness of some or all the individuals in it?'129 
The debate not only comprises the difficulties of distinguishing the behaviour of the 
individual actors from that of the corporate entity, but also the very question whether 
the legal entity in the metaphysical (ie descriptive) sense has a personality beyond 
the  mere  aggregate  of  its  individuals.  At  the  bottom  of  the  discussion  are  the 
irreconcilable schools of individualists and collectivists, having a common ground 
only on the view that in terms of moral responsibility the same criteria should apply 
to both humans and corporations.130 At the same time, however, they become fixated 
on the morality paradigm and thus 'lapse into the moral agency mire which is in itself 
a never-ending source of contention'.131
It  becomes clear against this  backdrop that it  cannot be the solution to simply 
apply  the  existent  (individualistic)  principles  of  traditional  criminal  law  to  legal 
entities. Criminal law itself to a large degree forms the problem since it has failed to 
develop in terms of collective behaviour, especially with regard to modern business 
corporations.132 It is thus worthwhile to take this step and revise the traditional notion 
126 Ibid at 43 and 49; Cf also Weigend, supra note 18 at 936.
127 Wells, supra note 83 at 64.
128 See Ibid at 74 et seq for a detailed discussion from an English law perspective. The aspect of 
subjectivity of corporations under international law is discussed in Chapter IV.4.
129 S Wolf cited in Pascal, supra note 125 at 48.
130 Stoitchkova, supra note 13 at 32.
131 Ibid at 30.











of (individual) criminal liability.133 This requires returning  to the roots of criminal 
responsibility with its implication of moral blame and from there explore principles 
of liability suitable for individual as well as collective actors.
Of course, the present study does not intend to deliver a holistic framework for 
criminal  justice  theory  in  general,  but  focuses  on  the  responsibility  of  TNCs  in 
international criminal  law. Interestingly,  international  law already is  familiar  with 
legal entities as subjects of law. In contrast to (domestic) criminal law it originates 
from a collectivistic view since it dealt with states as the sole subjects, or agents of 
atrocities. It was only with the introduction of criminal responsibility that individual 
(non-state) actors became addressees of international obligations.
3. Reconciling the moral guilt contention in international law
To  escape  the  theoretical  impasse  between  individualism  and  collectivism 
described above, three solutions are conceivable. Firstly, the guilt requirement can 
simply  not  be  applied  to  corporations  at  all  (strict  liability).  Secondly,  the  guilt 
concept can be adapted to the peculiarities of legal entities. A third option would be 
to hold corporations responsible only vicariously, that means to punish them for the 
offence  committed  by  corporate  officials.134 However,  this  indirect  way  of 
constructing  liability  does  not  solve  but  only  circumvent  the  problem  of  moral 
responsibility  on  part  of  corporations.  In  cases  of  a  direct  involvement  of 
corporations in international crimes, like the slave labour cases of  I.G. Farben or 
Krupp during the Third Reich,135 it would lead to the absurd consequence that the 
firm is  punished  as  ancillary  for  a  crime  it  is  actually  responsible  for  as  prime 
perpetrator. It would thus be inconsistent to build a system of ancillary liability of 
133 Likewise Pascal,  supra note 125 at  44;  Weigend,  supra note 18 at  936 on the other  hand is 
sceptical about the desirability of adapting criminal law concepts to corporations, at least as far as 
German law is concerned.
134 Cf Pascal, supra note 125 at 44. Theories of vicarious liability are namely the traditional common 
law concepts of respondeat superior, which attributes the act of any employee within the scope of 
its  employment  to  the corporation,  and  the  narrower  identification  doctrine,  which  attributes 
(only) the acts of representatives,  for they are acting as the “brains” of the corporation (also 
“directing mind theory”).











corporations on a foundation of primary liability of individuals. This study focusses 
instead  on  a  concept  allowing  for  the  determination  of  criteria  for  holding 
corporations directly responsible for its own wrong.
a. Applicability of the guilt principle  
One way of dealing with the notion of guilt  in traditional criminal law theory 
would  be  to  draw the  conclusion  that  it  is  simply  not  applicable  to  non-human 
entities. Removing the subjective element results in a strict liability approach, which 
is not unknown to domestic solutions for corporate criminal liability.136 Keeping in 
mind the gravity of international crimes, strict liability also does not appear beyond 
reason in international criminal law. Zappala considers the principle of nulla poena 
sine culpa inapplicable to the corporate entity by tracing it  back to its function of 
protection for the individual.137 As far as human dignity is to be protected by the guilt 
principle,  legal  entities,  albeit  attributed  with  personality  (whether  metaphysical, 
moral, or legal), do unquestionably not hold this kind of dignity. Rather, from the 
shareholders'  perspective,  the  corporation  is  no  more  than  property.  Moreover, 
assuming that personal guilt is only required to the extent a conviction expresses 
moral  reprobation,  as  Hoernle  has  established,138 corporations  do  not  need  the 
protection of the guilt principle unless sanctions actually do imply moral blame on 
the corporate entity.139 
The latter consideration leads to the fundamental understanding of the function of 
criminal law. Cockayne reveals a 'hidden truth of theory' in the need for answering 
the  underlying  question  “Why  do  we  punish?”.140 The  theoretical  approach  to 
criminal  law  in  general  can  be  divided  in  two  main  approaches,  as  Cockayne 
136 For an in-depth discussion of strict liability from a UK law perspective, see Wells, supra note 83 
at 67 et seqq.
137 Zappala in note 11 at 972. But at the same time he concedes that the nature of the liability would 
then not be criminal anymore.
138 T Hoernle cited in Weigend, supra note 18 at 940.
139 Ibid with further references. This is also the notion on which the German system of administrative 
liability ('Ordnungswidrigkeitensystem') is based.











remarks,  either  deontological  or  “consequentialist”.  While  the  deontological 
understanding draws a moral or ethical system based on the moral intent, under the 
consequentialist  approach,  criminal law is  merely a means of social  regulation.141 
Under this utilitarian premise, the focus is on the effects of a social act and turns on 
criminal punishment as a pragmatic instrument of preventing criminal activities.142 
The notion of just deserts is only of secondary relevance in this regard and also moral 
blame does not form an essential part. Hence, it is not necessary to apply the guilt 
principle  when strictly  following a  consequentialist  approach to  punishment.  But 
does international criminal justice pursue such an attitude?
Firstly, the basic purposes of punishment in international law do not necessarily 
have  to  be  consistent  with  the  penal  objectives  of  national law.143 International 
criminal law may have been inspired to a large degree, but has never been identical 
to domestic  approaches,  and is  in particular independent in its  development.  The 
ultimate aim of international criminal law is directed towards prevention of the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.144 This argues 
for  a  strong  consequentialist  orientation.  However,  the  criminal  tribunals  have 
proclaimed a long list of other goals,145 retribution being one of them and almost 
equally important as prevention. The conviction of core crimes necessarily involves a 
strong moral opprobrium. Drawing a comparison to domestic law approaches, strict 
liability can hence only be relevant with offences of minor wrong, such as regulatory 
offences.  Further,  as  argued  in  the  second  Chapter,  the  stigma  of  a  criminal 
conviction is  actually the main argument for combating corporate involvement in 
gross  human rights  abuses  with criminal  law.  To surrender  from imposing moral 
blame for the “crimes of crimes” is simply inconceivable and blurs the differences of 
criminal punishment to civil or administrative liability.
141 Ibid at 953.
142 Cf Damaska in Ibid at 966.
143 In Note, supra note 85 at 1961 (fn 25) the author in fact finds it dangerous to derive objectives of 
international criminal law directly from domestic analogues.
144 Cf para (5) of the Preamble of the Rome Statute; Regarding the International Criminal Tribunals 
for Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR), see Ibid at 1961 with further references.











The necessity of  moral  blame as  part  of  criminal  punishment  also refutes  the 
notion  that  the  guilt  principle  is  inapplicable  to  corporations  as  not  possessing 
dignity.  Strict liability dilutes the stigmatising effect of criminal law. As far as core 
crimes  are  concerned,  a  conviction  based  on  strict  liability  does  not  reflect  the 
tremendous wrongdoing and will never be an appropriate retaliation. As Stoitchkova 
concludes, it is neither feasible nor desirable to entirely detach the morality paradigm 
from legal personality.146 An appropriate solution must rather be able to reconcile the 
notion of guilt with the specific characteristics of the corporate entity. 
b. Adaptation of the guilt principle  
Although the guilt principle is to be applied with regard to corporations, this does 
not mean that it must be applied in the same way as to individuals. Pascal advocates 
for  a  'more  pragmatic  version  of  criminal  liability',  meaning  to  loosen  from the 
philosophical notion of a moral agent towards a more flexible approach of 'moral 
orientation'.147 Similarly,  Stoitchkova holds that culpability and liability may 'well 
flow from a  different  set  of  principles  than  those  applicable  to  individuals'  and 
advocates for a 'liability theory that  takes into account  existing differences while 
acknowledging the uniform applicability of certain moral precepts'.148 Wells further 
suggests use more neutral terminology such as 'accountability' with regard to legal 
entities instead of moral blame and use more functional criteria for the determination 
of culpability.149
International law provides for additional justification for adapting the notion of 
culpability with regard to corporations since the objects and purposes of international 
law  are  independent  to  domestic  criminal  law.  In  fact,  the  individualisation  of 
responsibility  was  in  particular  found  to  be  (politically)  desirable  based  on  the 
specific  aim  of  international  criminal  law  to  promote  peace  and  security.  A 
perception of collective responsibility between ethnic and religious groups involved 
146 Stoitchkova, supra note 13 at 32 et seq.
147 Pascal, supra note 125 at 44 et seq., 48.
148 Stoitchkova, supra note 13 at 33.











in atrocities has been believed to antagonise national reconciliation.150 For example 
the president of the ICTY comments on the role of the tribunal: 
Far from being a vehicle for revenge, it  is a tool for promoting reconciliation and 
restoring true peace. If responsibility for the appalling crimes perpetrated in the former 
Yugoslavia is not attributed to individuals, then whole ethnic and religious groups will 
be held accountable for these crimes and branded as criminal. ... The history of the 
region  clearly  shows  that  clinging  to  feelings  of  "collective  responsibility"  easily 
degenerates  into  resentment,  hatred  and  frustration  and  inevitably leads  to  further 
violence and new crimes.151
Making a clear distinction between business corporations, political organisations, and 
ethnic or religious groups, this objection does not serve as an argument against the 
criminalisation  of  corporations.  TNCs  are  in  no  way  perceived  as  part  of  the 
population.  The  punishment  of  a  firm involved  in  atrocities  is  actually  likely  to 
promote restorative justice.
Moreover,  the notion of individual  culpability is  unsuitable  with regard to the 
reality  of  international  crimes.  Stoitchkova  submits  that  'the  magnitude  and 
complexities  of  those  crimes  necessitate  accountability  avenues  that  adequately 
reflect  the  true  character  and  dynamics  of  deviance  in  group  settings'.152 A 
teleological (ie  goal-specific)  interpretation  of  the  aims  of  international  criminal 
law,153 in combination with the grave nature inherent to all core crimes, demands the 
creation of effective legal instruments.154 This is exemplified de lege lata by specific 
legal concepts such as superior responsibility of military commanders and civilian 
superiors, which has evolved from the needs of coping with hierarchical structures 
150 Damaska, supra note 86 at 332 with comprehensive reference to cases and materials of the ICTY 
and the ICTR.
151 President of the ICTY, Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory 
of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 (1994) at 12 (UN Doc. A/49/342).
152 Stoitchkova, supra note 13 at 93.
153 Namely the aim of prevention and “fighting impunity” in the first place, but also other goals such 
as  promoting  human  rights  values  and  peace  and  security  (including  stopping  an  ongoing 
conflict), cf. Damaska, supra note 86 at 331.
154 Cf  Andrew  Clapham,  “Extending  International  Criminal  Law  beyond  the  Individual  to 
Corporations and Armed Opposition Groups” (2008) 6:5 JICJ 899 at 902; Weigend, supra note 18 
at 940 also refers to authors who regard guilt as only one factor in determining criminal liability, 











inherent to systemic crimes.155 The effectiveness principle (ut res magis valeat quam 
pereat) is well established in the interpretation of treaties.156 However, it is infeasible 
to interpret art 25 of the Rome Statute in the way that corporations fall within the 
ratione personae of the ICC. Such an interpretation would be contrary to the wording 
of the norm, which is prohibited in criminal law (nullum crimen sine lege scripta et  
stricta). Rather the rule of effectiveness is relevant here in the absence of a treaty. Its 
object and purpose create pressure on the international community to find a legal 
solution to corporate involvement in international crimes and at the time justifies a 
legal compromise on the traditional notion of the principle of culpability.
To conclude this Chapter, it  can be hold with good reasons that the seemingly 
irreconcilable debate on criminal responsibility of legal entities can be overcome in 
international law. The actual challenge is the development of a  sui generis type of 
corporate  guilt.157 It  is  worthwhile  to  examine  if  precedent  of  corporate  criminal 
liability can be found already in international law, and thus serve as groundwork for 
the construction of such a de lege ferenda concept.
155 Art 28 Rome Statute.
156 Art 31 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969); Cf Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Olufemi A 
Elias & Panos Merkouris, The issues of treaty interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties: 30 years on (Leiden; Biggleswade: Brill; Extenza Turpin [distributor], 2010) at 
155.











IV. The  status quo  of corporate criminal liability in international law  
This Chapter undertakes a “stock-taking” of the notion of corporate criminal liability 
in international law. After starting with the 'birth certificate' of international criminal 
law,158 the Nuremberg trials,159 the discussion revolving around a proposal submitted 
during the negotiations  of the Rome Statute  is  illustrated and a survey of recent 
international  instruments  conducted.  Eventually,  it  is  analysed  whether  today 
corporate liability exists in international criminal law.
1. Precedent of the Nuremberg trials
Although the tribunals established by the Allied Powers had jurisdiction only over 
natural persons and therefore no company could b  convicted for its involvement in 
the Nazi crimes, it is instructive for the present study how the judges dealt with the 
organisational context in which the atrocities happened.160
a. Responsibility of non-state actors  
First of all, the fundamental legacy of the Nuremberg trials should be highlighted. 
Non-state  actors  for  the  first  time  were  held  responsible  for  violations  of 
international law. With regard to business involvement in mass crimes, the tribunal 
rejected the suggestion that international law only attaches to individuals who acted 
on behalf of the state and 'private industrialists should be given the benefit of the plea 
of ignorance of the law'.161
158 Gerhard Werle, Principles of international criminal law (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2005) at 
6.
159 For a short introduction to the Nuremberg trials, see Chapter II 1.b.
160 No other international criminal tribunal has addressed the issue of corporate responsibility in this 
direct way again. See Fauchald & Stigen, supra note 9 at 1037 regarding the ICTY and the ICTR.
161 United States v. Krupp, IX Trials of War Criminals Before The Nuremberg Military Tribunals 











In this  context the IMT stressed that '[c]rimes against  international law [were] 
committed by men, not by abstract entities.162 This reasoning has been frequently 
cited  as  an  authoritative  argument  against  imposing  liability  on  legal  persons.163 
However, the context of this statement reveals that it actually aimed at rejecting the 
defendant's  defence  of  having  acted  in  an  official  capacity.  It  is  a  fundamental 
paradigm-shift with a view to international law that not only states are subjects of 
international law, but also non-state actors. The court stated: 'That international law 
imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon States has long been 
recognized.' It continued: '[O]nly by punishing individuals who commit such crimes 
can the provisions of international law be enforced'.164 The term 'abstract  entities' 
therefore  refers  to  states  only.  Nothing  is  said  about  the  status  of  private  legal 
persons.165 In  fact,  having  established  that  non-state  actors  are  subjects  of 
international law, one could argue that it is conceptually only of secondary relevance 
whether this refers exclusively to natural persons.166
b. The concept of criminal organisations  
The  concept  of  criminal  organisations  was  adopted  by  the  drafters  of  the 
Nuremberg  Charter  to  cope  with  the  innumerable  civilian  collaborators  of  the 
criminal  regime  of  Nazi  Germany.  It  considers  the  organisational  context  of  the 
crimes  committed  by  individuals  on  several  hierarchical  levels  and  provides  for 
dealing efficiently with a large number of defendants. It also bridges the gap left by 
162 Judgement against Goering et al (1946), I 1946 Trial of the Major War Criminals 171 (available 
on http://www.mazal.org/archive/imt/01/IMT01-T171.htm) at 223.
163 See for example Weigend, supra note 18 at 927.
164 Judgement against Goering et al, supra note 162 at 223.
165 See also the statement of Schabas in note 11 at 964.
166 Volker Nerlich, “Core Crimes and Transnational Business Corporations” (2010) 8 JICJ 895 at 899 











the conspiracy doctrine,  which only had a narrow scope of application under the 
Charter and would have left many second-level perpetrators go unpunished.167
The  mechanism of  the  concept  of  criminal  organisations  was  to  establish  the 
responsibility of the group or organisation in the first place and subsequently punish 
the  members  for  the  crimes  committed  by that  organisation,  but  on  the  basis  of 
individual guilt.168 This approach reflects the role of the organisation as prime actor. 
In fact, the prosecutors started with the investigation of the legal persons and the 
organisations themselves  even had lawyers to  defend them.169 Several  political  or 
military groups and organisations were declared criminal by the IMT and the national 
courts  and military tribunals relied extensively on this  doctrine in the subsequent 
trials of individuals.170
However,  in  terms  of  precedent  for  corporate  criminal  liability  this  doctrine 
should not  be overstated.  Since the tribunals  did not  have jurisdiction over  legal 
persons, the declaration as criminal organisation did not entail any penalties. And 
although the implication of a moral verdict can hardly be denied, the purpose and 
objective behind the concept was merely to facilitate the prosecution of the members 
of a group or organisation. As an evidentiary rule it served to overcome procedural 
hurdles of trying the members. This is reflected by the comment of the IMT, which 
saw no advantage in declaring organisations criminal as long as separate trials of its 
members were possible.171 Such a reasoning applies in particular to corporations as 
167 The Nuremberg Charter only provided for conspiracy in relation to crimes against peace and the 
concept was applied restrictively by the tribunal. Only government officials of the immediate 
leadership circle were convicted of conspiracy for waging an aggressive war.  Not even firms 
directly involved in the re-armament of Germany were considered to have the requisite mens rea.
168 Art. 9 Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (1945) provides that “[a]t the 
trial of any individual member of any group or organization the Tribunal may declare ... that the 
group or organization of which the individual  was a member was a criminal  organization … 
[sic]”. Article 10 continues that “[i]n cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by 
the Tribunal,  the competent  national  authority of  any Signatory shall  have the right  to bring 
individual to trial for membership therein .... In any such case the criminal nature of the group or 
organization is considered proved and shall not be questioned [sic].”
169 Clapham, supra note 15 at 164 with further references.
170 Ibid at 163; Stoitchkova, supra note 13 at 49.











their size generally allows for individual prosecutions.172 Furthermore, the criminal 
nature of a company, even if it was directly involved in atrocities, could hardly be 
established since the primary objective inherent to all business is financial profit, not 
the commission of crimes. At the trials of corporate agents the tribunals did in fact 
not make use of the concept of criminal organisation with regard to corporations.
c. Responsibility of corporations as such  
Industry played an important role in the Third Reich since it enabled the Nazi 
government to make the secret plan of waging war a reality.  A wide range of firms 
and industrialists kept the German war machinery going by contributing material and 
financial support. Although no corporate officials were tried as major war criminals 
before the IMT, prosecution of industrialists took place before the national tribunals 
established  under  Control  Council  Law  No  10.173 Some  of  these  cases  deal 
extensively with the responsibility of the firms as such. In fact, the judgements give 
the impression that 'justice was to be served by prosecuting the firm, rather than the 
individual'.174
i. The I. G. Farben case  
In the case of I.G. Farben175, held before the USMT, five directors of the firm I.G. 
Farben were convicted for the use of slave labour. It was the first time that a court 
held representatives of a business collectively liable. The defendants were accused of 
having 'used the Farben organization as an instrument by and through which they 
172 Stoitchkova, supra note 13 at 52.
173 In  fact,  the Allied Powers  considered a separate  IMT trial  exclusively for  the many business 
actors  involved  in  the  Nazi  atrocities.  This  was,  however,  never  held  since  the  economy of 
Germany soon was supposed to be stabilised in view of the cold war. See, Ibid at 51 with further 
references.
174 Andrew Clapham, “The complexity of  international  criminal  law: Looking beyond individual 
responsibility to the responsibility of organizations, corporations and states” in Ramesh Thakur, 
ed, From sovereign impunity to international accountability - the search for justice in a world of 
states (Tokyo New York: United Nations University Press, 2004) at 236.
175 United  States  v.  Krauch,  et.  al  (1952),  VIII  1952  Trials  of  the  War  Criminals  Before  the 












committed the crimes'.176 This reasoning involved that the tribunal first examined the 
role of the firm in order to determine the individual guilt of the defendants.177 The 
tribunal explicitly considered Farben as a legal entity to have violated international 
law: 'Where private individuals,  including juristic persons,  proceed to exploit  the 
military occupancy by acquiring private property against the will and consent of the 
former owner, such action, not being expressly justified by any applicable provision 
of the Hague Regulations, is in violation of international law.'178 
It  is  stressed  again  that  the  accused  were  convicted  as  individuals  for  their 
contribution to the crimes, not as representatives for corporate activities. The court 
explains 'that the corporate defendant, Farben, is not before the bar of this Tribunal 
and cannot be subjected to criminal penalties in these proceedings. We have used the 
term “Farben” as descriptive of the instrumentality of cohesion in the name of which 
the  enumerated  acts  of  spoliation  were  committed.  But  corporations  act  through 
individuals....  '.179 However,  it  can be drawn from the reasoning that  the tribunal 
holds  corporations  capable  to  violate  international  law.180 Moreover,  as  Clapham 
notes, the courts accepted the implication that 'the corporation itself committed the 
war crime and its directors were being convicted for belonging to the organization 
[sic]'.181
The legal basis of this construct can be seen in art 2 (2) (e) CCL No 10. It states 
that  a person is  deemed to  have committed a  crime if  he was a member of any 
organisation or group connected with the commission of such crime. This marks the 
difference between the concept of criminal organisations applied by the IMT and the 
reasoning of  the  USMT in the  Farben case.  Pursuant  to  art  9  of  the  Nuremberg 
Charter the organisation is declared criminal 'in connection with any act of which the 
176 Ibid at 1108.
177 Ibid at 1153.
178 Ibid at 1132 (emphasis added).
179 Ibid at 1153.
180 Clapham, supra note 17 at 239.











individual may be convicted'. In the Farben case the blame was not inferred from the 
conviction of an individual, but the other way around. The firm itself was found to be 
connected with the commission of a war crime. Clapham thus rightly interprets the 
judgement 'as implying that the Farben company itself had committed the relevant 
war crime, even though the Tribunal had no jurisdiction over Farben as such'.182
ii. The Krupp case  
In the Krupp case,183 Alfried Krupp and other executives of the Krupp firm were 
convicted for crimes with respect to plunder, spoliation and the use of forced labour. 
The court describes in detail the role of the firm and the policy of using slave labour 
to decrease production costs. As in the case of I.G. Farben, the tribunal holds that the 
Krupp  firm  had  committed  a  violation  of  the  Hague  Regulations  by  planning, 
desiring and purposefully seeking forced labour.184 It  elaborates on the role of the 
company as prime perpetrator  by stating that  'the initiative for the acquisition of 
properties, machines and materials ..., was that of the Krupp firm and that it  had 
utilized the Reich government and Reich agencies whenever necessary to accomplish 
its  purposes … [sic]'.185  These very clear words express the notion that  'it  is the 
actions of the enterprise rather than individual defendants that appear criminal'.186
Moreover, the tribunal expressively referred to the intent of the firm and by that 
established the notion of mens rea on part of a legal entity. The court found that 'the 
Krupp firm had manifested not only its willingness but its ardent desire to employ 
forced labor [sic].'187. Ramasastry rightly draws from this way of reasoning that '(1) 
some criminal acts are the manifestation of planning and execution at the firm level, 
and (2) courts can attribute liability to the TNC as well as its employees'.188
182 Clapham, supra note 15 at 171; Cf also Stoitchkova, supra note 13 at 60.
183 Krupp Case, supra note 161.
184 Ibid at 1352 et seq.
185 Ibid at 1372.
186 Ramasastry, supra note 37 at 108.











d. Conclusion  
The judgements of the Nuremberg trials, especially those dealing with the great 
industrialists,  can  be  seen  not  only  as  a  starting  point  for  individual  criminal 
responsibility for business activities,189 but also  provide for the foundations of the 
liability  of  TNCs  in  international  law.190 This  conclusion  originates  less  from 
doctrinal technicalities developed by the courts, but rather it is the acknowledgement 
of the existence of corporate fault. 
The value of the judgements lies in the attempt to directly blame the firms for 
their criminal conduct in the course of World War II. The cases of I.G. Farben and 
Krupp established that corporations have obligations under inter ational law. Based 
on  that  responsibility,  individuals  were  actually  held  liable  vicariously  for  the 
wrongdoing  of  the  firm.  In  contrast,  the  analysis  of  the  concept  of  criminal 
organisations  has  shown that  it  was  only  a  mechanism to  overcome evidentiary 
hurdles in regard to the conviction of the members of these organisation.  It  does 
therefore not constitute precedent for the liability of corporations as such.
2. The Rome Statute draft article on corporate liability
In  the  course of  the  negotiations  on the  Rome Statute,  the issue of  the  ICC's 
jurisdiction over legal persons was controversial. France submitted a proposal to the 
Preparatory Committee in 1996 providing for the inclusion of legal persons in the 
jurisdiction of the ICC.191 States were excluded from the outset and liability limited 
to private legal persons only. The motive behind this constraint is obvious, as no state 
would have been willing to defend itself before the new ICC.192 The main purpose of 
188 Cf Ramasastry, supra note 37 at 112.
189 The contribution of Jessberger, supra note 73 deals extensively with the standards for attributing 
individual responsibility established by the I.G. Farben trial.
190 Ramasastry, supra note 37 at 92.
191 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Report (1998) at 
49. The  proposed  art  23  (5)  of  the  draft  statute  provides  that:  “The  Court  shall  also  have 
jurisdiction over legal persons, with the exception of States, when the crimes committed were 
committed on behalf of such legal persons or by their agencies or representatives.”











this  draft  provision  was  to  facilitate  restitution  and  compensation  orders,  as 
individual criminals might not have enough assets.193 Further,  a conviction would 
attach opprobrium to the corporation, and the deterrent effect of a possible conviction 
would  lead  to  cautious  decision-making  and  thus  prevent  crimes.  However,  the 
proposal was eventually withdrawn by France when it became clear that there was no 
possibility for the proposal to be adopted by consensus. A footnote added to the draft 
provision by the Preparatory Committee comments on the difficulties:
There  is  a  deep  divergence  of  views  as  to  the  advisability  of  including  criminal 
responsibility of legal persons in the Statute. Many delegations are strongly opposed, 
whereas  some  strongly  favour  its  inclusion.  Others  have  an  open  mind.  Some 
delegations  hold  the  view  that  providing  for  only  the  civil  or  administrative 
responsibility/liability of legal persons could provide a middle ground. This avenue, 
however, has not been thoroughly discussed ….194
The arguments of the opposing delegations were conceptual difficulties as well as 
procedural  problems.195 Detraction  from  the  court's  jurisdictional  focus  on  the 
individual was apprehended as well as evidentiary problems. Further, no universally 
recognised  common  standards  for  attribution  existed.  Some  major  criminal  law 
systems rejected the notion of corporate criminal liability at  all.  This fact  was in 
consequence  deemed  irreconcilable  with  the  principle  of  complementarity  of  the 
ICC.196 
Since it  was assumed that the Rome Statute could not oblige states to subject 
corporations  to criminal sanctions at the domestic level, states might inevitably find 
themselves unable or unwilling to prosecute pursuant to art 17 (1) Rome Statute.197 
The legal consequence would be that the case would always be admissible before the 
193 Fauchald & Stigen, supra note 9 at 1038 with further references.
194 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, supra note 191 
at 49.
195 See Otto Triffterer & Kai Ambos, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court:  observers’ notes,  article  by article  (München;  Portland, Or.;  Baden-Baden: C.H. Beck; 
Hart; Nomos, 2008) at 746.
196 William Schabas, The international criminal court: a commentary on the Rome statute (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 426. The principle of complementarity is enshrined 
in para 10 of the Preamble and art 1 of the Rome Statute. It will be discussed in Chapter V.3.











ICC. Such a result was regarded as unacceptable since the subsidiarity of the ICC 
was not  only introduced for  pragmatic  reasons,  but  in  the first  place intended to 
safeguard the sovereignty of the states and therefore not subject to compromise.
The  legacy of  the  Nuremberg  trials  was  interestingly utilised  by both  parties. 
While the proponents contended that the exclusion of legal persons 'would be a step 
back in the light of Nuremberg and subsequent trials', others held the proposal as 
'immature  or  infeasible'  with  regard  to  discussions  surrounding  the  Nuremberg 
precedent and the lack of international law and practice.198
The  failed  proposal  of  France  illustrates  the  disagreement  prevailing  in  the 
international  community  on  the  matter  of  criminal  liability  of  legal  persons. 
However,  it  is  important  to  note  that  no  delegation  challenged  the  fundamental 
assumption established at Nuremberg that legal persons are bound by international 
criminal  law.  As  Clapham points  out,  rather  '[t]he  disagreements  arose  over  the 
complexities involved in international trial of a non-natural person: How to serve the 
indictment, who would represent the interests of the legal person, how much intention 
needed to be proved, how to ensure that natural persons could not hide behind group 
responsibility.'199 Furthermore, the legal entities the delegates had in mind were less 
private business corporations but rather quasi-public entities and non-governmental 
associations.200 In the context of the difficult negotiations on the creation of a whole 
new court,  it  becomes obvious that the idea of extending the jurisdiction to legal 
persons was not ripe at this stage.
3. Recent developments in international law
Since the unsuccessful attempt to extend the jurisdiction of the ICC to legal persons, 
more than fifteen years of development in international law passed by. The fact that 
the draft was not raised again at the recent Review Conference of the Rome Statute 
in Kampala does not mean that the trend towards corporate accountability came to a 
198 Stoitchkova, supra note 13 at 15.












halt.  A  variety  of  international  instruments  on  criminal  law  introduced  by 
international  organisations  attend  to  this  topic.  None  of  these  conventions  are 
concerned with international core crimes. However, it is well possible that the status 
quo of  the  Rome Statute  has  been  overtaken  by the  recent  developments  and  a 
concept of corporate criminal liability in international law has emerged in the shadow 
of the ICC.
a.  European instruments on criminal law  
Several criminal law instruments of the European Union (EU) and the Council of 
Europe deal with the liability of corporations in different fields, such as financial and 
environmental crimes, as well as sexual abuse of children.201 A convention clearly 
setting  an  example  regarding  the  regulation  of  corporate  liability  is  the  “Second 
Protocol  to  the  European  Convention  on  the  protection  of  the  European 
Communities' financial interests”.202 This instrument aims at,  inter alia, introducing 
fraud against EU budget funds as a crime. The concept designed in this convention 
has not only been adopted in subsequent conventions on corporate liability, but has 
been copied or paraphrased in European as well as international conventions.203
Since  the  legislative  competence  of  the  EU comprises  criminal  law only to  a 
limited  degree204 and  most  Member  States  do  not  provide  for  corporate  criminal 
liability, the provisions on corporate liability are carefully worded. States are (only) 
required to 'take the necessary measures to ensure that a legal person … is punishable 
201 For an overview, see Swart in note 11 at 948.
202 Second protocol to the European Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ 
financial interests (1997). This convention is going to be enacted as a directive in the near future, 
cf.  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the criminal-law 
protection of the Community’s financial interests (2001).
203 Cf Swart in note 11 at 949.
204 The EU can only act within the powers conferred on it pursuant to art. 5 (1) Treaty on European 
Union (Consolidated version)  (2012) (TEU). A legislative competence to regulate  on judicial 
cooperation in  criminal  matters  can be found in art  82,  83  Treaty on the Functioning of  the 
European Union (Consolidated version) (2012) (TFEU). Apart from that, only art. 325 (4) TFEU 
provides for a special legislative authorisation. It is limited, however, to measures warranting an 
effective and equivalent  protection in  all  Member States  against  fraud affecting the financial 











by effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, which shall include criminal or  
non-criminal fines and may include other sanctions.'205
The term “criminal liability” is not mentioned in regard to corporations.206 Beyond 
the non-reparatory element, the determination of the legal nature of liability is left 
open  to  the  member  states.  As  they  are  free  to  limit  sanctions  to  non-criminal 
penalties, eg administrative fines, it is doubtful whether one can say that a general 
concept of corporate criminal liability embraces at the international level.207 Although 
the European Commission has answered this question in the affirmative in a draft 
protocol,208 the states are in no way obliged by the conventions to introduce criminal 
provisions for corporations. States opposing the idea of corporate criminal liability, 
such as Germany, Spain, Italy, and Portugal, may as well fit the provisions into their 
legal system of administrative sanctions.
European  instruments  may  thus  reflect  the  global  trend  towards  corporate 
accountability. They do not, however, establish criminal liability for corporations on 
the international level.209
b.  International conventions  
The pattern of European instruments has consequently been adopted in several 
conventions.  The  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development 
(OECD) concluded the Anti-Bribery Convention,210 followed by three instruments of 
the  United  Nations  (UN)  promoting  corporate  responsibility  in  the  fields  of 
205 Art 4 of the Second protocol to the European Convention on the protection of the European 
Communities’ financial interests.
206 It should be noted here that the wording in more recent legal instruments apparently assumes the 
existence  of  corporate  criminal  liability  in  national  law.  Directive  2008/99/EC  eg  does  not 
mention non-criminal sanctions for legal persons (art 7). Only by conversion to art 5 (penalties in 
general) it becomes clear that criminal penalties are not obligatory.
207 Cf the statement of Swart in note 11 at 949.
208 See G J M Christens & Jean Parade, European criminal law (The Hague; New York: Kludger 
Law International, 2002) at 457 with further references.
209 Also Ibid footnote 105.












terrorism, transnational organised crime, and anti-corruption.211 Further, two recently 
concluded conventions, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)212 and the 
World  Health  Organisation  (WHO)  Draft  protocol  to  the  2003  Framework 
Convention  on  Tobacco  Control  (2012),213 shall  be  mentioned  to  show  that  the 
formulation brought into being by the EU can be described as today's standard phrase 
on corporate liability in international law.
The dissent of the international community in terms of corporate criminal liability 
is expressly reflected in these conventions. States are obliged to take the necessary 
measures to establish the liability of legal persons, but only 'in accordance with its 
legal principles'.214 The legal nature of this liability is left to the sole discretion of the 
states, as long as sanctions are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. The OECD 
substantiates the meaning of this formula in its Good Practice Guidance, but does not 
recommend a specific form of liability.215
c.  Conclusion  
A striking uniformity emerged in the phrasing of provisions on the liability of 
legal persons in international legal instruments. Their wording confirms the picture 
drawn above regarding European instruments. Corporate criminal responsibility was 
clearly  set  on  the  agenda,  however,  the  states'  obligation  to  hold  corporations 
accountable remains subject to the traditions and legal system of domestic law. Since 
the failed attempt to extend the jurisdiction of the ICC, practice in international law 
did  not  develop  towards  accepting  the  notion  of  corporate  criminal  liability,  but 
rather  to  a  consolidation of  the  objections.  International  law today is  marked by 
211 UN International  Convention  for  the  Suppression  of  the  Financing of  Terrorism (1999),  UN 
Convention  against  Transnational  Organized  Crime  (2000),  and  UN  Convention  against 
Corruption (UNCAC) (2003).
212 Article 23 (5).
213 Article  14  (1)  Draft  Protocol  to  Eliminate  Illicit  Trade  in  Tobacco  Products  (2012), 
FCTC/COP/5/6.
214 Cf. Art. 2 of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.
215 Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 











disagreement  and  an  independent  concept  of  corporate  criminal  liability  in 
international  law  has  not  been  established  by the  instruments  discussed.216 Quite 
contrary, it is the degree of recognition in domestic jurisdictions that determines the 
status quo on the international level. A focus on domestic tendencies is thus directly 
relevant for the recognition of a genuine international concept.
4. Does corporate liability exist today in international criminal law?
The  preceding  sections  have  shown that  neither  international  conventions  nor 
judicial decisions have established the notion of criminal liability of corporations. 
However international law is not created exclusively by treaties, but can also develop 
by  state  practice  as  customary  law.217 A  rule  of  substantive  international  law 
providing for the punishment  of corporations  might  have been established in  the 
form of 'international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law'.218 
The  existence  of  customary  law  would  allow  a  tribunal  authorised  to  exercise 
jurisdiction over legal persons in the future to apply this norm without facing the 
objection of retroactivity (nullum crimen sine lege).219 The recognition of custom 
presupposes not only 'a constant and uniform usage' by states (usus), but also the 
conviction that the conduct is legally obligatory (opinio juris  sive necessitatis).220 
Furthermore,  the  binding  nature  of  customary international  law is  relative  in  the 
216 The conclusion drawn by Clapham, supra note 15 at 178 that “the international legal order has 
already adapted to define corporate crimes in international law and to oblige States to criminalize 
this behaviour [sic]” goes to far. He neglects the important fact that the definition of the nature of 
liability is left open to the states.
217 Art 38 para 1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute) is traditionally taken 
to provide a definitive enumeration of sources of international law. International conventions, 
international custom, and general principles are listed as well as judicial decisions and teaching of 
the most  highly qualified publicists.  The latter  two are to  be interpreted less  as  a  source  of 
international law than a source of evidence for proving the law.
218 Art 38 para 1 (b) ICJ Statute.
219 Nerlich, supra note 166 at 898.
220 Colombian-Peruvian asylum case, Judgement of November 20 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, at 276; cf 












sense  that  initially  only the  states  practising  the  conduct  are  bound until  an  all-
encompassing international norm may emerge.
Three reference points must be differentiated when examining corporate criminal 
responsibility under international custom.221 In a first step the fundamental question 
is whether corporations are bound by the prohibitions underlying international core 
crimes ('Verbotsnorm'). The second issue is whether a contravention actually entails 
criminal punishment ('Sanktionsnorm'). Only in a third step, a court's jurisdiction to 
prosecute legal persons is of relevance.222
The  applicability  of  a  Verbotsnorm  to  corporations  touches  the  question  of 
whether they have an international legal personality, ie are a subject of international 
law.223 The Nuremberg judgements have already indicated that  business firms are 
capable of violating international law. Far more difficult is thus the second aspect, as 
a Verbotsnorm is often grounded in international customary law.224
a.  Obligations of corporations under international law  
In regard to core crimes, the prohibition does not necessarily have to flow from 
international criminal law, but can be rooted in all fields of international law. Nerlich 
takes  the example of war  crimes,  where the prohibited conduct  is  predominantly 
contained in international humanitarian law.225 However, the answer to the question 
whether corporations are bound by these norms is not as easy as the Nuremberg 
precedence may suggest.  As explained  above,  international  law in the  first  place 
deals with states. Non-state actors have been attributed with legal personality only to 
a limited extent. With regard to corporations, Cassese observes that 'states have not 
upgraded  these  entities  to  international  subjects  proper'  and  submits  that 
221 Geneuss et al, supra note 5 at 967; similarly Nerlich, supra note 166 at 898.
222 The extension of the jurisdiction of the ICC to legal persons will be discussed in Chapter V.
223 Schwarzenberger, cited in Fauchald & Stigen, supra note 9 at 1029 (fn 7), defines: “International 
personality means capacity to be a bearer of rights and duties under international law”.
224 Werle, supra note 158 at marg. 960.











'multinational corporations possess no international rights and duties: they are only 
subjects of municipal and “transnational law”.'226 
For the present purpose, the legal personality of corporations in international law 
does  not  have  to  be  established  in  its  entirety  and also  the  counter-argument  of 
Cassese not challenged completely. It is sufficient to assert that corporations do have 
limited  legal  personality  regarding  the  prohibition  of  human  rights  violations 
amounting  to  international  crimes.  This  can  be  based  on  two  preliminary 
considerations on the structural differences of international criminal law, submitted 
by van den Herik and Cernic: Firstly, imposing obligations on corporations 'does not 
require a paradigm shift' in international criminal law.227 In contrast to human rights 
law,  the  primary  duty-holders  of  international  criminal  law  have  always  been 
individual non-state actors.228 It is conceptually only of secondary relevance whether 
liability of individuals includes exclusively natural persons, or also legal persons.229 
Secondly, the prohibition of the core international crimes, namely genocide, crimes 
against  humanity,  war  crimes,  and  the  crime  of  aggression,  are  norms  of  ius  
cogens.230 These norms are defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
as  'peremptory  norms  of  general  international  law  from which  no  derogation  is 
permitted',231 and thus exist beyond any state practice.
That legal persons are subject to these international obligations can be established 
with  reference  to  the  field  of  human  rights  law,  from  which  these  obligations 
originate. Legal persons are already treated equally as natural persons when it comes 
to enjoying rights under human rights law.232 For example, corporations are vested 
226 Cassese cited in Clapham, supra note 15 at 190.
227 Van den Herik & Cernic, supra note 10 at 742.
228 In contrast, the notion of “Crimes of states” was dismissed from the outset for political reasons, 
Cassese in note 11 at 969.
229 Nerlich, supra note 166 at 899 with regard to the USMT in Flick et al establishing that non-state 
actors are responsible under international criminal law.
230 Cf van den Herik & Cernic, supra note 10 at 742.
231 Art 50 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1966).











with  rights  under  European  human  rights  law  and  have  locus  standi  before  the 
European Court for Human Rights (ECHR).233 Conversely, corporations must also be 
regarded as duty-holders  for the underlying prohibition of  international  crimes.234 
Considering the object and purpose of human rights law it would simply 'be illogical 
to grant corporations rights under international law, including international human 
rights law, while simultaneously allowing them to avoid responsibility for the most 
egregious violations of the same body of law'.235 Further, the international regulation 
of  corporate  behaviour  reflects  the  state's  recognition  that  legal  persons  are 
addressees of international law.236 The fact that most treaties call upon states parties 
to  implement  and  enforce  these  rules  is  irrelevant  in  this  regard.  As  Stephens 
comments, '[t]he lack of international enforcement and the need for national action, 
however, should not be mistaken for the absence of an international norm'.237
b.  Transgressions entailing criminal responsibility under customary law  
The common approach to leave enforcement of international instruments open for 
states poses a great difficulty for identifying a norm in international customary law 
entailing criminal punishment for the violation of the underlying prohibition of core 
international  crimes.  However,  it  has  been  submitted  that  the  state  practice  and 
opinio  juris  necessary  to  establish  custom  can  be  observed  in  regard  to  the 
predominant acceptance of (domestic) corporate criminal liability.238
From a global perspective, the majority of states apparently recognise the notion 
of corporate criminal liability.239 Especially in Western Europe civil law tradition, the 
233 Art 1 of the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms as amended by Protocol No 11 (1952) for example expressly assigns the protection of 
property  to  natural  and legal  persons.  In  Agrotexim  v  Greece,  A330-A (1995),  the  ECHR 
established that in principle the corporation, not its shareholders, are victims of expropriation.
234 Cf Clapham, supra note 15 at 190.
235 Slye, supra note 24 at 959.
236 For a survey of international legal instruments dealing with corporate liability, see Chapter IV.3.
237 Stephens, supra note 3 at 70.











few resisting states turn in at fast pace.240 The recommendation of the Council of 
Europe in 1988 to provide for criminal and sanctions of enterprises in national law 
has  come to  fruition.241 Not  only France,  which  decisively shaped the  individual 
focus  of  criminal  law  during  the  French  revolution,242 has  reclaimed  collective 
responsibility,243 but  also  other  countries  like,  inter  alia,  the  Netherlands,244 
Switzerland,245 Belgium,  Norway,  and  Austria  have  established  criminal 
responsibility of legal entities.246
Considering this almost universal recognition, a constant usage seems obvious. 
But,  as  mentioned  above  in  Chapter  II,  a  comparative  survey  requires  the 
consideration of certain restraints. Most obviously the classification of legal systems 
in common law and civil  law systems hold fundamental differences. Referring to 
England, Wells warns that one should not 'assume that it is possible to pull out one 
section of a criminal code and compare it with another jurisdiction on the assumption 
that everything else in the way of legal institutional and cultural arrangements will 
remain  conveniently  static'.247 Most  corporate  liability  provisions  in  England  for 
example  are  found  in  the  regulatory  field  and  are  thus  rather  comparable  with 
239 Fauchald & Stigen, supra note 9 at 1040 with further references; cf also Anita Ramasastry, Robert 
C Thompson & New Security Programme, Commerce, crime and conflict:  legal  remedies for 
private sector  liability for  grave breaches  of  international  law:  a  survey of  sixteen countries: 
executive summary (Oslo: Fafo, 2006).
240 Even  in  Germany,  a  strong  opponent  for  traditional  legal  reasons,  demands  for  a  pragmatic 
instrument to hold companies accountable for financial and economic crimes come to fruition. 
The Minister of Justice of the federal State of Nordrhein-Westfalen has announced a legislative 
initiative for early 2013 to end the “island status” of Germany in Europe regarding the rejection 
of  corporate  criminal  liability  (cf.  <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/vorab/nrw-justizminister-
kutschaty-fordert-unternehmensschliessungen-a-850760.html>).
241 Art I (3) (b) Recommendation No. R (88) 18.
242 For a thorough look on the beginnings of corporate sanctioning see Stessens, supra note 17 at 
494.
243 Art 121-2 Code Pénal.
244 Art 51 Wetboek van Strafrecht.
245 Art 102 Strafgesetzbuch.
246 Weigend, supra note 18 at 928; Ramasastry, Thompson & New Security Programme, supra note 
239.











administrative  regulation  in  civil  law  systems.248 Strong  opponents  of  corporate 
criminal liability like Germany have put in place an administrative system capable of 
imposing  sanctions  on  corporations  with  a  similar  effect.249 Wells  draws  the 
conclusion that '[i]n all systems there is a mix and we should not conceive of them as 
separate, unrelated alternatives'.250
A more  suitable  point  of  reference  for  examining  customary  law is  therefore 
domestic  regulation  regarding  violations  of  human  rights  norms  amounting  to 
international crimes. In fact, several states apply incorporated provisions of the Rome 
Statute to legal persons although they are not obliged to this by international law.251 
Some of these states have done so even though their legal system rejects the notion in 
principle.252 This state practice might arguably serve as an authoritative source for 
establishing both a constant and uniform usage as well as opinio juris.
However, apart from the subject matter of regulation the attribution of liability to 
legal persons does not follow a uniform standard.253 The International Commission of 
Jurists observes that 'in some jurisdictions, the business can be held criminally liable 
for the acts of its employees, in others a business is directly accountable for the acts 
of  the  senior  management',  and  a  third  approach emerges  'which  focuses  on  the 
culture within the business, and the way in which the business is run'.254 Further, with 
248 Ibid at 128.
249 Sec 30 of the German Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz (Administrative Offences Act).
250 Wells, supra note 83 at 129.
251 The common law countries  Australia,  Canada  and  United  Kingdom as  well  as  the  civil  law 
countries Belgium and Netherlands apply genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes to 
legal  persons.  France  and  Norway  as  well  as  India,  USA,  and  Japan  do  so  too,  but  have 
incorporated core crimes only in part. For an overview, see the survey of Ramasastry, Thompson 
& New Security Programme, supra note 239 at 30.
252 Argentina and Indonesia in principle reject criminal liability of legal persons, but have ignored 
conceptual  issues  and  adopted  statutes  providing  for  corporate  criminal  liability  in  terms  of 
specific  international  crimes  (such  as  environmental  and  commercial  crimes,  corruption  and 
terrorism).
253 For an overview of the different attribution standards in USA and selected Western European 
countries, see the comparative analysis of Safwat & Beale, supra note 71 at 163, concluding that 
“[t]here is no European consensus on the standard for corporate liability”. 











a view to the specific intent requirement of genocide,  the common law concept of 
corporate liability does not necessarily cover mens rea offences.255
Lastly, the disagreement on the international level puts the necessary opinio juris 
in question. No international tribunal has been vested with jurisdiction over legal 
persons, which 'indicates that a sufficiently strong consensus among states for such 
responsibility  in  international  law  is  lacking'.256 Moreover,  the  discussion  at  the 
negotiations to the Rome Statute as well  as the common practice in international 
instruments to leave a definition of the nature of liability open clearly reflects that the 
states do not see the notion as being ripe for international law.
The rejection of opinio juris is also supported by the finding of a USA domestic 
court applying international law. The Court of Appeals held in Kiobel v Royal Dutch 
Petroleum  that  'corporate  liability  is  not  a  discernable  –  much  less  universally 
recognized – norm of customary international law that we may apply pursuant to the 
ATS [sic]', '[b]ecause customary international law consists of only those norms that 
are specific, universal, and obligatory in the relations of States inter se, and because 
no  corporation  has  ever  been  subject  to  any  form of  liability  (whether  civil  or 
criminal) under the customary international law of human rights'.257
The predominant recognition of criminal liability of legal entities in domestic law 
can therefore not in itself prove customary international law. Overall, a regulation by 
treaty is for the time being required to punish corporations for grave violations of 
human rights norms amounting to international crimes.
255 Murphy in note 11 at 976.
256 Fauchald  & Stigen,  supra  note  9  at  1041 bringing  further  evidence  by citing quotations  the 
Special Rapporteur of the ILC and the UN Secretary General’s special representative for business 
and human rights.
257 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), at 24 et seq. A petition for review of this decision has been granted 











V. Implementing corporate criminal liability into the Rome Statute  
The result of this study is that criminal liability of private legal persons is not part 
of  international  law until  the present  day.  Thus,  leeway is  existent  regarding the 
questions how a de lege ferenda international regulation may be constructed and how 
an effective enforcement can be warranted. A manifest and intensively discussed way 
of implementing the notion of criminal responsibility of corporations is to extend the 
jurisdiction  of  the  ICC.  As  already  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  the  issue  of 
liability of legal persons was not broached at the Rome Statute Review Conference at 
Kampala in 2010. However, the Rome Statute can be amended at any time with a 
two-thirds majority of states sarties according to arts 121, 123 of the Rome Statute. 
The blocking period of eight years has expired in 2009.
Apart from this option, it has been submitted that a new specialised tribunal could 
be created.258 However, this route is obviously not a more viable alternative to an 
amendment of the Rome Statute. Creating a whole new substantial and procedural 
legal framework is a complicated endeavour, let alone the efforts needed to put this 
treaty into practice. The consent required would exceed the volition needed to extend 
the jurisdiction of the ICC in many ways. Hence, if no consent can be found for an 
amendment  of  the Rome Statute,  a fortiori  no new international  tribunal  will  be 
created.
An amendment  of  the  Rome Statute  would  involve  some substantial  changes. 
Solely the extension of jurisdiction of the ICC to legal persons by amending art. 25 
(1)  Rome  Statute  does  not  suffice.  Stoitchkova  observes  that  the  'current  Rome 
Statute framework is not tailored for application to non-natural persons' and '[n]either 
does it  appear  suitable  … to corporations  per  se'.259 On the other  hand,  it  is  not 
258 Jordan Sundell, “Ill-Gotten Gains: The Case for International Corporate Criminal Liability” 20:2 
MinnJInt’l L 648 at 678.











necessary to create a separate system since the Rome Statute framework 'provides 
sufficient room for manoeuvre'.260 
An essential element of regulation is the definition of what constitutes a criminal 
act on part of the corporation, ie under which circumstances acts of natural persons 
can be attributed to the corporate entity. Further, sanctions suitable to legal persons 
have  to  be  implemented.  In  this  regard,  it  is  important  to  specify  whether  a 
preventive (compliance) system within the corporation can lead to the mitigation of 
punishment in the case of criminal acts of employees. Ultimately, procedural issues 
revolving  around the  complementarity principle  of  the  ICC remain  to  be solved. 
These questions require extensive substantial analysis, which this contribution cannot 
cover  exhaustively.261 The  scope  here  is  therefore  restricted  to  outlining  major 
challenges  and  suggesting  possible  options  regarding  a  regulation  in  the  Rome 
Statute framework.
1. Different concepts of corporate liability
The structure and method of an international regulation providing for the criminal 
responsibility of legal persons is still open to development. This concerns in the first 
place the issue of attributing a criminal act carried out by a natural person to the legal 
entity. Further, regarding the standard of liability, ie the requisite “mental” element of 
a  corporation,  we  are,  as  Clapham  notes,  unlikely  to  see  an  unambiguous 
international standard develop as long as no international court is able to exercise 
criminal  jurisdiction  over  legal  entities.262 Apart  from the  numerous  international 
instruments mentioned in the foregoing Chapter, pioneering national efforts to hold 
corporations  criminally  accountable  for  international  crimes  as  well  as  the 
unsuccessful  proposal  for  the  Rome  Statute  are  influential  for  the  method  of 
attributing liability to the corporate entity.263 
260 Ibid at 138.
261 See,  the  comprehensive  study of  Stoitchkova,  Ibid  at  95  et  seqq  (Chapter  5  “The  Criminal 
Liability of Corporations within the Rome Statute Framework”).











A detailed exploration of the various legal approaches to construct the liability of 
legal persons would go beyond of the scope of this study and does not add value in 
terms of international law.264 It may be suggested though that a concept of attribution 
already seems to have emerged in international law. The advanced version of the 
French  proposal  to  the  Rome  Convention  discussed  above  follows  an  indirect 
approach.  Liability is  imposed on the legal person if  the natural  person who has 
committed a criminal act 'was in a position of control within the juridical person' and 
was 'acting on behalf and with the explicit consent of that juridical person and in the 
course of its activities'.265 Most importantly, the provision presupposes the conviction 
of that natural person before a legal entity can be held liable.
A concept of indirect liability based on acts of the key personnel representing the 
corporation appears to be also leading in international instruments.266 The UNCAC 
requires states parties to hold legal persons liable for corruptive criminal offences by 
a natural person 'who has a  leading position within the legal person', based on the 
formal  position  (power  of  representation)  or  de  facto  powers  (authority  to  take 
decisions  or  exercise  control).267 The  same  test  marks  the  standard  in  European 
regulation,  such  as  the  Second  Protocol  to  the  European  Convention  on  the 
protection of the European Communities’ financial interests.268 The Implementation 
Guide of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention recommends similar approaches, either 
263 For  a  detailed  examination  of  the  approach  followed  in  the  French  proposal  to  the  Rome 
Conference, see Clapham, supra note 15 at 150; Relevant domestic regulation is discussed in 
Joanna  Kyriakakis,  “Australian  Prosecution  of  Corporations  for  International  Crimes:  The 
Potential  of  the Commonwealth Criminal  Code” (2007) 5:4 JICJ  809; and W Cory Wanless, 
“Corporate Liability for International Crimes under Canada’s Crimes Against Humanity and War 
Crimes Act” (2009) 7:1 JICJ 201.
264 Slye, supra note 24 at 964 et seqq gives an overview of the different approaches; For a detailed 
discussion, see Wells, supra note 83 at 146 (Chapter 8 “The Responsible Corporation”).
265 UN Doc. A/Conf.183/C.1/WGGP/L.5/Rev.2; Cf also Clapham, supra note 174 at 245 with further 
references.
266 See also the survey of international instruments in Chapter IV.3.
267 Art 18 (1) UNCAC.











based on the high level managerial authority of the natural person, or a flexible level 
of authority reflecting the wide variety of decision-making.269
Without undertaking an assessment of the variety of possible concepts of attribution 
it  may  be  asserted  with  reference  to  the  findings  of  Chapter  III  that  indirect 
(derivative) liability is unsuitable for determining genuine fault on the part of the 
corporation. Vicarious approaches 'refute the separate existence of corporations and 
hence ascribe to them a derivative form of liability which is necessarily vicarious in 
character'.270 Further, the requisite conviction of a natural person in part undermines 
the incentives for introducing corporate criminal liability as discussed in Chapter II. 
In particular the modus operandi of collective criminal endeavours based on division 
of  labour  and  multi-layered  responsibility  renders  the  attribution  of  fault  to 
individuals  difficult  in  practice.271 The  principle  of  effectiveness  requires  that  a 
concept of corporate liability provides especially for cases in which an individual 
cannot  be  held  responsible.  The  relationship  between  individual  and  corporate 
liability has been described above as cumulative,272 but not in the sense that one takes 
precedence  over  the  other.  Since  different  connecting  factors  are  concerned 
(individual  fault  as  opposed corporate  fault),  the  two routes  of  responsibility are 
rightly seen to run parallel to each other.
An  alternative  concept  capable  of  determining  genuine  corporate  fault  may 
therefore  be  highlighted  here.  Stoitchkova puts  forward  a  sui  generis concept  of 
direct  corporate  criminal  liability,  based  on  the  theory  of  'constructive  corporate 
fault'.273 This approach recognises the distinct existence of legal entities and applies 
an  objective  test  of  reasonableness  to  delineate  culpable  conduct  on  part  of  the 
corporation  from  isolated  individual  misconduct  of  employees.274 Further,  the 
269 Annex I,  Recommendation of  the  Council  for  Further  Combating Bribery of  Foreign  Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, B).
270 Stoitchkova, supra note 13 at 111.
271 Cf Ibid at 112.
272 See Chapter II.4.a
273 Stoitchkova, supra note 13 at 118 et seqq referring to W S Laufer.











approach provides for a corporate mental element which is identified by drawing 
upon  organisational  characteristics  (such  as  policies,  culture,  and  structures)  'or 
practices  which  (…)  appear  to  expressly  or  implicitly  authorise,  encourage  or 
otherwise support the violation of the law'.275 This method has the advantage that it 
allows for the differentiation between the mental states provided for in art 30 of the 
Rome Statute.276 It  therefore  comprises  indirect  as  well  as  direct  involvement  of 
corporations in international crimes.
A  similar  concept  has  already  been  introduced  in  Australian  domestic  law, 
providing for the liability of legal persons in regard to international core crimes.277 
This  progressive  approach  factors  in  the  term  'corporate  culture',  meaning  'an 
attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing within the body corporate 
...',278 to  prove  that  the  corporation  tolerated,  directed,  or  encouraged  criminal 
transgressions.
2. Restraints of effective prosecution
Chapter II asserted that an effective enforcement can only be warranted by an 
international court. The reason for this presumption does not only lie in the suspected 
power imbalance between host-states and TNCs.279 According to Sundell there are 
convincing  arguments  that  prove  international  proceedings  against  multinationals 
preferable to domestic courts.280 Firstly, not only volatile states but in general 'few 
states have both the clout and proclivity to take up major corporate human rights 
275 Ibid.
276 Ibid at 138. It is thus not confined to a negligence-standard such as other collectivistic approaches 
focussing solely on the failure to prevent criminal conduct of employees.
277 See, Kyriakakis, supra note 263.
278 Sec 12.3 (2) (c) and (d), (4), and (6) of the Australian Criminal Code.
279 See, Chapter II.1.; Apart from the risk of corruption and undue influence, Sundell, supra note 258 
at 660 also illustrates the opposite effect that states may not yield to powerful corporations, but 
“victimize corporations through unfair, politicized laws”.











offenses [sic]'.281 Also Western European countries have retracted from efforts to hold 
corporate offenders liable for human rights abuses.  For example Belgium, a state 
applying the core crime provisions to legal persons, in view of political pressure of 
the USA repealed a law granting domestic courts universal jurisdiction.282 Further, 
the  advantages  of  domestic  prosecution  of  human  rights  abuses  are  not  of  great 
relevance in the context of corporate wrongdoing (in contrast to state injustice). The 
benefits  listed  by  Sundell,  namely  the  promotion  of  political  legitimacy  and 
demonstration of capacity as well as advancing the local legal system and reinforcing 
the rule of law, are important rather in the context of transitional justice.283
Moreover,  international  tribunals,  in  particular  the  ICC,  feature  some  unique 
advantages. International institutions enjoy a global backing and the possibility of 
unfair politically driven proceedings is minimal.284 Procedural problems concerning 
jurisdictional issues and access to evidence as well as the enforcement of judgements 
are less of concern in international proceedings.285 States parties to the treaty creating 
an international tribunal are in principle obliged to cooperate and give effect to the 
tribunal's  judgements.  Due  to  the  international  recognition,  third  parties  are  also 
likely to be more supportive.
Lastly, the weaknesses of international courts, namely the alleged distance from 
the criminal events and its victims as well as the perceived stigma of victor's justice, 
appear  less  severe  with  regard  to  proceedings  against  private  corporations.286 In 
contrast  to  the  trial  of  state  actors  or  members  of  rebel  groups,  the  preventive 
message of a conviction of TNCs is in the first place addressed to other corporations 
and  less  to  local  people.  The  firms  involved  in  crime  are  mostly  of  Western 
background and are not perceived as part of the local population.
281 Ibid at 670 et seq.
282 See,  HRW,  “Belgium:  Universal  Jurisdiction  Law  Repealed”,  2  August  2012, 
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2003/08/01/belgium-universal-jurisdiction-law-repealed>.
283 Cf Sundell, supra note 258 at 659 et seq.
284 Ibid at 660 et seq.
285 Ibid at 661.











However,  it  is  neither  feasible  nor  was  it  ever  intended  that  all  breaches  of 
international criminal law would be adjudicated before the ICC. The court does not 
have the capacity or resources to do so and the state parties to the Rome Statute did 
not want to completely cede their sovereignty to the ICC in terms of jurisdiction over 
international crimes. It marks a founding principle of the Rome Statute that the ICC 
'shall  be  complementary  to  national  criminal  jurisdictions'.287 The  prosecutorial 
strategy of the ICC is limited to only 'select for prosecution those situated at the 
highest  echelons  of  responsibility,  including  those  who  ordered,  financed,  or 
otherwise organized the alleged crimes'.288 
Indeed,  domestic  courts  are  in  practice  the  most  important  fori to  enforce 
international criminal law. With view to the enforcement gap at the domestic level 
giving cause to the need for international regulation, one might observe a vicious 
circle. But the extension of the ICC to legal persons might serve as an incentive for 
states to fill the gap themselves.289 Kyriakakis rightly concludes that '[t]he inclusion 
of private corporations in the ICC's jurisdiction could function both as a compulsion 
to  reticent  states  to  act  in  relation  to  the  problem  of  multinational  corporate 
involvement in international crime, as well as provide a safety net where none will 
do so'.290
3. The Complementarity contention
The  complementarity  regime  of  the  ICC  was  raised  as  an  objection  against 
including legal persons in the jurisdiction of the ICC.291 Art 17 Rome Statute gave 
rise to the concern of some states that the rejection of subjecting legal persons to 
criminal punishment on the domestic level could be interpreted as 'unwillingness or 
inability'  to prosecute,  which would trigger the admissibility of a case before the 
287 Art 1 of the Rome Statute.
288 Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009 – 2012 (2010), at 6.
289 Cf van den Herik & Cernic, supra note 10 at 741.
290 Joanna Kyriakakis,  “Corporations  and  the International  Criminal  Court:  the Complementarity 
Objection Stripped Bare” (2007) 19:1 CrimLF 115 at 150.











ICC. Before going into a detailed discussion of the problem, it has to be stressed here 
that the practical importance of the complementarity objection diminishes with the 
on-going development towards corporate accountability in domestic legal systems. It 
only applies to the few states not accepting the notion of corporate criminal liability.
In  a  thorough examination  by Kyriakakis,  the complementarity contention  has 
been interpreted to involve a twofold dimension. Firstly, as reflected by the text of 
the Rome Statute, the operability of the complementarity regime of the ICC could be 
affected  if  states  are  unable  to  exercise  jurisdiction  on  the  basis  of  a  lack  of 
legislative competence  ('textual integrity').292 Secondly, from an interpretative  view, 
especially  states  rejecting  the  implementation  of  corporate  criminal  liability  for 
conceptual  or  legal-philosophical  reasons  are  concerned  of  a  'discriminatory 
impact'.293
In  regard  to  the  problem of  textual  integrity  of  the  Rome Statute,  Kyriakakis 
concludes that 'stripped bare' the complementarity argument poses no legal obstacle 
to extending the jurisdiction of the ICC, 'aside from reminding decision makers of 
the overarching interests they must balance: effective criminal justice and an end to 
impunity, with a preference for a state based system'.294 This result can be based on a 
strict interpretation of the wording of art 17 (1) Rome Statute. The norm can be seen 
as  simply  not  applicable  to  cases  of  corporations  registered  in  states  which  not 
providing for the criminal responsibility of legal persons. Since those states have not 
'seized itself of the matter' they are precluded from challenging the admissibility of 
the case before the ICC.295 In fact, the admissibility question solved by art 17 Rome 
Statute  presupposes a dispute  on concurring jurisdictions  between the ICC and a 
national state.
However, as a second aspect there is still the underlying discriminatory impact on 
states consciously refusing to follow the ICC in exercising jurisdiction over legal 
292 Kyriakakis, supra note 290 at 122.
293 Ibid at 136.
294 Ibid at 151.











persons  with  reference  to  peculiarities  in  the  domestic  legal  system.  Kyriakakis 
translates the complementarity objection under this view as a 'concern that such a 
discriminatory effect undermines the sovereign right of the state to first go at the 
prosecution … and therefore perverts the principle of a “complementary” rather than 
a “supplanting” permanent court'.296 However, such a claim is based on a “perverted” 
understanding of the term complementarity itself. The principle of complementarity 
is  correctly  described  as  'an  attempt  at  reconciling  two  competing  interests,  i.e. 
national sovereignty with the goals of international criminal justice'.297 A balance of 
these  interests  presupposes  that  sovereignty  does  not  prevail  under  any 
circumstances, but is subject to the needs of international criminal law. Regarding the 
regulatory gap demonstrated in Chapter II, an intervention of international criminal 
law is indeed required to punish and prevent corporate involvement in gross human 
rights  abuses.  The aim of  ending impunity by filling  the  regulatory gap existing 
under  national  law  prevails  over  the  (conditional)  priority  of  domestic 
jurisdictions.298
It is further important to emphasise that there is no obligation for states to adapt 
their  national  legislation  to  the  sc pe  of  the  Rome Statute.299 The  discriminatory 
effect is thus only an insinuation of the view that complementarity implicates the 
harmonisation of national legislation with the standard of the Rome Statue. Such a 
conclusion is in fact not part of the underlying concept of international criminal law. 
There are other provisions in the Rome Statute which could be made subject to the 
complementarity objection because national legislation does not allow prosecution 
under  specific  circumstances.  Art  27  Rome  Statute  for  example  provides  that  a 
procedural rule hindering prosecution because of the defendant's status of immunity 
under national law does not bar the ICC from exercising jurisdiction.300
296 Ibid at 136.
297 Stoitchkova, supra note 13 at 170.
298 Ibid.
299 Kyriakakis, supra note 290 at 130 with further references.
300 Such a rule exists under German law. Pursuant to art. 46 (2) German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) a 
Member of Parliament may not be called to account or arrested for a punishable offence without 











Moreover, it is not a viable way to circumvent the resistance of residual states by 
limiting  the  jurisdiction  of  the  ICC  to  corporations  registered  in  states  that  do 
recognise  corporate  criminal  punishment.  The  practical  consequence  of  this 
consideration is that the states resisting the adoption of corporate criminal liability 
would create safe havens for corporations doing business in the vicinity of human 
rights violations.301 This solution is moreover questionable since it fails to take into 
account  that  states  may  indeed  have  a  system  of  “effective,  proportionate  and 
dissuasive sanctions” other than criminal punishment.302 To eliminate these problems, 
Haigh  suggests  an  'exception-based  approach',  according  to  which  also  civil  or 
administrative proceedings against a corporation might exclude the jurisdiction of the 
ICC.303 
But still  corporations would most likely prefer these states as safe havens and 
exert  great  pressure  on  the  government  not  to  change  the  legal  status  quo.  The 
adoption of corporate criminal liability is seen as a 'commercial disadvantage' in this 
regard.304 As examined in Chapter II, non-criminal regulation bears certain practical 
and procedural advantages for the defendant,  especially the possibility of settling 
matters out of court.  The aim of closing the regulatory (and enforcement) gap in 
terms  of  corporate  human  rights  violations  amounting  to  international  crimes 
requires a level playing field which only international legislation can achieve. An 
extension  of  the  ICC's  jurisdiction  to  legal  persons  would  with  a  view  of  the 
complementarity principle create a situation where national states 'have the ability to 
say, we either do this or the ICC will'.305
301 Cf Kyriakakis, supra note 290 at 130.
302 Cf Stoitchkova, supra note 13 at 172.
303 Kathryn  Haigh,  “Extending  the  International  Criminal  Court’s  jurisdiction  to  corporations: 
overcoming complementarity concerns” (2008) 14:1 AJHR 199 at 213.












4. Issues regarding substantive provisions
In contrast to business related crimes such as corruption or environmental crimes, 
the core international crimes as stipulated in arts 5 et seqq Rome Statute bear certain 
characteristics. The criminal conduct in part  requires a large-scale commission or 
conduct in a specific context. Further, the crime of genocide (art 6 Rome Statute) 
presupposes a special intent exceeding the knowledge and intent regarding the actus  
reus. It is questionable to which extent corporations are legally, but also practically, 
capable of committing these crimes of special nature.
a. The requirement of state involvement  
The involvement of corporations in human rights violations is in practice mostly 
described as indirect  and participating.  The ICJ Expert  Legal Panel on Corporate 
Complicity in International Crimes for example accentuates three practically relevant 
factual situations: 'the provision of goods and services to those who commit crimes, 
the use of suppliers  that  commit  crimes,  and the commission of crimes by hired 
security  services'.306 Speaking  of  complicity,  it  is  commonly  assumed  that  the 
primary responsibility lies with state actors. The corporation may be held liable as an 
accomplice in this type of situation.307 However, as illustrated, there might be other 
situations where the corporation is not only regarded as accomplice in someone else's 
offence, but rather as the main perpetrator.308 
In  terms  of  primary  liability  of  corporations  it  is  questionable  whether  state 
involvement  actually constitutes  a  legal  requirement.  This question can be easily 
answered in the affirmative with regard to the crime of aggression. Pursuant to art 8 
bis (1) Rome Statute  the action of  'a  person in  a  position effectively to  exercise 
control over or to direct the political or military action of a State [sic]' is required.309 
The crime of aggression is to be classified as a “leadership crime”. A corporation can 
306 International Commission of Jurists, supra note 103 at 37.
307 Clapham, supra note 154 at 907 et seq. with reference to ATCA litigation.
308 For an introduction to the ways TNCs can get involved in international crimes, see Chapter II.2.a.
309 Note that the amendments to the Rome Statute concluded at the Kampala Review Conference 











thus conceptually never be the principal perpetrator, but only an accomplice to the 
crime of aggression.
A differentiated examination is warranted regarding the crimes pursuant to arts 6 
to 8 Rome Statute. The Nuremberg trials have established that non-state actors are in 
general subject of international law and capable of committing international crimes. 
Accordingly the ICTR found that also individuals not holding public authority or de 
facto representing the government, ie civilians, can be found guilty of war crimes.310 
It  can be drawn from this  jurisprudence  that,  provided the contextual  element  is 
present (ie an armed conflict), the legal status of the perpetrator is insignificant for 
liability and thus also corporations can commit acts of war crimes pursuant to art 8 
Rome Statute.311
Similarly, the contextual requirement of crimes against humanity, a “widespread 
or  systematic  attack”,  laid  down  in  art  7  Rome  Statute  does  not  necessarily 
presuppose action on the part of the state. The definition in art 7 (2) (a) Rome Statute 
mentions  a  state  policy  as  well  as  an  'organizational  policy'  and  thus  expressly 
includes non-state collective entities. However, it is in doubt that a corporation can in 
practice be considered such an organisation and launch an attack against a civilian 
population itself.312 There is dispute as to the scope of the term organisation. While 
the  jurisprudence  of  the  ad-hoc  tribunals  interprets  the  element  restrictively  and 
requires a group of persons governing a specific territory,313 it has been submitted 
that  any group of persons may fulfil  the requirement  'if  it  has at  its  disposal,  in 
material and personnel, the potential to commit a widespread or systematic attack'.314 
It is conceivable that in particular private military firms have these resources. But in 
the actual case of an attack it would have be to reconsidered if the corporation still 
310 Prosecutor v Jean Paul Akayesu, 2001.
311 Nerlich, supra note 166 at 904.
312 Ibid at 904 et seq.
313 Prosecutor v Tadic, 2000 at margin 653.
314 Werle, supra note 158 at margin 663; See further the detailed analysis of Gerhard Werle & Boris 
Burghardt, “Do Crimes Against Humanity Require the Participation of a State or a ‘State-like’ 











acts  in  the  pursuit  of  profit,  or  is  not  correctly  classified  as  a  criminal  gang  or 
terrorist group.
Genocide (art 6 Rome Statute) does not expressly require a contextual element so 
that a singular act by any individual would suffice, provided that it is carried out with 
the requisite genocidal intent. The jurisprudence of the ICTR and ICTY, however, 
argues that such an intent can hardly be accepted without a multitude of criminal 
actions backed by a corresponding plan and organisation.315 The Element of Crimes 
to the Rome Statute even require that '[t]he conduct took place in the context of a 
manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or was conduct that 
could itself effect such destruction'.316 Even though theoretically TNCs may have the 
power to fulfil these requirements, it is highly doubtful in practice that such conduct 
occurs in the absence of the involvement of a state (or state-like entity).317
Overall, it can be said that the complexities and magnitude of international core 
crimes limit its scope of application to corporations, in legal as well as in practical 
terms.  Accordingly,  criminal  responsibility  of  TNCs  is  only  conceivable  in 
exceptional situations. These, however, will be of great concern to the international 
community so that the importance of a legal possibility to punish corporations for 
international crimes is not diminished by its practical rareness.
b. Specific intent (  dolus specialis  ) 
The crime of genocide pursuant to art 6 Rome Statute presupposes, additionally to 
the mens rea corresponding to the criminal conduct (actus reus), the intent to destroy 
a group as such. Apart from the practical likelihood that a multinational will ever get 
into  the  situation  to  be  accused  of  principal  perpetration  of  genocide,318 it  is 
315 Nerlich,  supra note 166 at  906 with further  references  to the ICTR cases  of  Kayishema and 
Ruzindana as well as the ICTY case Jelisic.
316 Cf Elements of Crimes (2002), ICC-ASP/1/3 (part II-B), art 6 (a) (genocide by killing).
317 Nerlich, supra note 166 at 906.
318 In terms of accomplice liability pursuant to art 25 (3) (b) to (e) Rome Statute, the genocidal intent 
is not required on part of the accomplice. Rather the requisite  mens rea of the accomplice is 











questionable whether specific intent can be in fact  existent on the part of a legal 
person and how it can be established.
First of all, it is noteworthy that the special intent requirement is of no distinct 
quality than the “general” subjective elements of mens rea pursuant to art 30 Rome 
Statute. Hence, the requirements of verifying special intent depend on the concept of 
corporate liability being adopted.319 Derivative approaches such as laid out in the 
French proposal to art 25 Rome Statute uncover the specific intent in the mindset of 
the natural person and attribute it only in a second step to the corporate entity. The 
weakness of this method lies in the fact that in complex organisations with division 
of labour it is not necessarily the individual carrying out the actus reus who holds the 
requisite mens rea'.320
Collective approaches in contrast  are  capable of establishing the special  intent 
directly on the  part  of  the legal  entity.  The  sui  generis approach by Stoitchkova 
introduced above broadens the focus from the individual to the 'corporate attitude as 
a  manifestation  of  organisational  mens  rea'.321 A similar  method,  establishing  the 
mental  state  of  a collective entity by inference from its  individual  members,  has 
already  been  developed  with  regard  to  the  specific  intent  of  states  and  state 
organisations. In the Genocide Case, the International Court of Justice examined the 
conduct and attitude of individuals as well as official statements in order to establish 
genocidal  intent  with  respect  to  governmental  group VRS and even the  State  of 
Republika  Srpska.322 Cassese  also  reports  from  the  approach  of  the  Darfur 
Commission:323
319 As to the different approaches to construct corporate criminal liability, see above sect 1.
320 Stoitchkova, supra note 13 at 112.
321 Ibid at 133.
322 Case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 2007.
323 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-











We asked ourselves … can we infer from all the actions of state agents (the Minister 
of Defence, the three Generals in charge of the Darfur area and the people fighting, the 
pilots and so on) that the state of Sudan was pursuing a genocidal intent …? This was 
a question of analysing the practice, the behaviour of state agents and then of trying to 
infer from their behaviour whether or not there was an intent in the government ….'324
He then  draws  a  comparison  and  argues  that  this  notion  shall  apply  mutatis  
mutandis to corporations.325 Schabas advances this statement and suggests to replace 
the term intent with policy in regard to legal entities.326 This conceptual approach 
matches exactly with the findings of Chapter III.3.b.,  where the adaptation of the 
guilt principle towards rather functional criteria of accountability has been suggested.
324 Cassese in note 11 at 968.
325 Cassese in Ibid at 969.











VI. Conclusion  
1. Summary of principal findings
Holding business corporations accountable for gross violations of human rights 
law amounting to international crimes poses a great challenge to the international 
community. The difficulties in grappling with business participation in international 
crimes traces back to the beginning of international criminal  law, the Nuremberg 
trials. In particular transnationally acting corporations (TNCs) investing in regions 
governed  by  repressive  states  are  at  risk  of  becoming  complicit  in  international 
crimes. To legally determine indirect involvement of corporations in crimes carried 
out by government forces or armed rebel groups is particularly difficult.
However, it is beyond question that criminal punishment must be the inevitable 
response  to  international  “core”  crimes.  Given  the  gravity  of  the  offences,  civil 
liability  or  administrative  sanctions  might  be  suitable  additionally,  but  not 
alternatively. Moreover, it  is desirable to not only punish the individual corporate 
officials who actually carried out the criminal conduct, but also the corporate entity 
as such. Modern organisational theory reveals that the behaviour of individuals is 
essentially influenced by the organisational framework it acts in. The conviction of 
individuals can therefore not appropriately capture the dimension of the wrongful 
action on part of the collective entity. This holds especially true in the context of 
international crimes which in part feature a systemic (policy) element and in practice 
require collective action. Corporate punishment is further essential to reflect the non-
hierarchical nature of modern corporate criminal endeavour. Relevant criteria from a 
criminological perspective, such as influence, policy, and cooperative strategies, can 
only be appropriately considered by prosecuting the corporation as such.
Criminal responsibility of corporations presupposes a conceptual paradigm shift in 
criminal law theory. In particular domestic legal systems with a civil law background 
are  historically  focussed  on  individual  guilt,  which  implies  the  existence  of  a 











by this individualistic preoccupation, but is independent in its development. In fact, 
an adaptation of the notion of culpability towards more functional criteria for legal 
persons is warranted by the principle of effectiveness in regard to the grave nature 
inherent to core international crimes.
Although the notion of corporate criminal liability is on the rise on the domestic 
level  and  widely recognised  in  common law legal  traditions,  the  enforcement  of 
human rights by means of criminal law against large corporations is virtually non-
existent. It can be questioned whether national states are actually capable of holding 
multinationals accountable. The flexible “de-nationalised” structure of TNCs creates 
jurisdictional  problems for the state  of  incorporation when crimes are  committed 
abroad.  Host  states,  especially  those  with  rich  natural  resources  but  politically 
unstable structures, are often de facto unable to prosecute with regard to the financial 
and political influence of large corporations.
In the absence of a coordinated national effort, regulation and enforcement at the 
international level is a worthwhile option for effectively ensuring accountability for 
corporate international crimes. However, although there is consensus that non-state 
actors,  including private corporations,  are bound by the underlying prohibition of 
international crimes, a norm providing for the criminal punishment of corporations in 
case  of  a  breach  is  as  yet  not  part  of  international  law.  No  international  legal 
instrument  establishes  an  obligation  for  states  to  provide  for  the  punishment  of 
corporations for international crimes. A norm creating corporate criminal liability can 
also not be found under customary international law since the domestic theories of 
attributing criminal liability to corporations are not uniform and some states reject 
the  notion  entirely  for  conceptual  reasons.  Further,  an  attempt  to  extend  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  International  Criminal  Court  (ICC)  to  legal  persons  found  no 
acceptance during the drafting of the Rome Statute. In fact, no international criminal 
law tribunal has ever been vested with jurisdiction over legal entities and thus no 
precedence exists. Nevertheless, it is inspiring for future approaches how the United 
States Military Tribunal dealt with the direct business involvement in Nazi crimes.
Extending  the  jurisdiction  of  the  ICC to  corporations  by amending  the  Rome 











responsibility in international law. This requires certain substantial changes in the 
Rome Statute framework, in particular the adoption of a concept of imputing liability 
on  the  corporate  entity.  An  indirect  (derivative)  approach  has  been  favoured  in 
international instruments. However, a holistic concept would be preferable in order to 
determine fault directly on the part of the corporation. 
The  complementarity  regime  of  the  ICC  does  not  pose  an  insurmountable 
objection to extending the Court's ratio personae with regard to states not providing 
for criminal punishment of legal persons. It is rather an incentive to adapt the legal 
system since states are discharged from the burden of being solely responsible for 
prosecuting  corporations  complicit  in  international  crimes.  Yet,  the  practical 
scenarios conceivable where TNCs are liable as principal perpetrator are limited due 
to the special requirements of the core criminal offences pursuant to arts 5 to 8 Rome 
Statute.  Particularly  relevant  remains,  however,  accomplice  liability  in  situations 
where corporations participate in the crimes of state organs or rebel groups.
2. Prospective fields of study
This study can be seen as a fragment of a greater concept of accountability which 
warrants  further  exploration.  More  precisely there  are  two dimensions  of  such a 
greater concept. On a micro scale it may relate to the liability of legal persons as 
such. This includes bringing the notion of corporate criminal liability together with 
criminal  liability  of  state(-like)  organisations  such  as  political  parties  and  armed 
opposition groups,327 and ultimately of states themselves.328 Inspired by studies of 
collective behaviour and dynamics of organisational deviance, a synergy effect can 
be  expected  from a  comparative  study  of  the  several  theories  revolving  around 
327 Cf  Clapham,  supra  note  154  at  919  et  seq  noting  that  “[w]hile  the  practice  concerning  the 
criminalization  of  individual  members  of  rebel  groups  under  international  law  is  now well-
established  ...,  the  question  of  whether  the  groups  as  such  can  be  said  to  have  violated 
international criminal law remains, however, unexplored”.
328 The notion of “Crimes of States” is not new and accepted in theory. However, in the past the 
implementation of state criminal responsibility was rejected for political reasons. For a thorough 












holding different collectives responsible. A uniform concept of criminal liability of 
collective entities might be the outcome.
In  extension  of  this  “micro-level-concept”,  there  would  also  room  for 
development on a macro scale. An all-embracing theory of criminal responsibility, 
comprising natural as well as legal persons, could be the result. On the lookout for a 
nexus  binding  together  theories  of  state  and individual  liability  for  the  crime  of 
genocide, Schabas expressed his vision for a holistic concept of international crimes. 
He illustrates:  'It  is  like  the  nuclear  physicists  looking  for  the  Hicks  boson,  the 
elusive particle that gives us a holistic theory of the universe. My own thinking right 
now is that there probably is a particle that links them together and that it is about 
state policy; it is about policy crimes'.329 This idea takes on the recent challenges in 
(inter-)national  conflicts  and  modern  warfare,  which  poses  one  of  the  major 
challenges  to  international  law  in  the  near  future.  The  network-like  rather  than 
hierarchical structure of criminal endeavour requires a paradigm shift of the methods 
to establish criminal responsibility. Criteria such as influence, culture and policy are 
worthwhile to consider in this regard. Of course, before such a link can be found 
between the manifold landscape of liability theories, this progressive idea will have 
to undergo a lot of contention. However, it is more than worth an exploration. Since 
notions of individual as well as collective liability converge in international law, and 
offers room for development independent of traditional domestic legal systems, it 
offers an ideal environment. To pick up the analogy used by Schabas, only five years 
after  this  comment  the  Hicks  boson  has  (most  likely)  actually  been  discovered. 
Hence, there is apparently a good chance to find this nexus in international criminal 
law too.
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